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This survey' is a continuation of previous articles2 on the topic of
Florida criminal law and procedure.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 1.8503
There continues to be litigation on the scope of rule 1.850, i.e., what
alleged errors may properly be raised by motion under the rule.
1. This survey covers cases reported in 200 So.2d 161 through 221 So.2d and laws
enacted by the 1969 General Session of the Florida Legislature.
2. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1960); Wills, Criminal Law,
16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 225 (1961) (Florida survey); Wills, Criminal Law, 18 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 381 (1963) (Florida survey); Wills, Criminal Law and Procedure, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV.
246 (1965) (Florida survey); Wills, Criminal Law and Procedure, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 240
(1967) (Florida survey).
3. MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE: HEARING:
APPEAL:
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of
Florida claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the
State of Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or
that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to col-
lateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitu-
tional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral
attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the produc-
tion of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is au-
thorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained
if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
Note: Formerly Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1.
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A. Matters Subject to Direct Appeal
Because the rule was designed for collateral attack, ordinarily it may
not be used to review matters which could have been raised on direct
appeal. Thus, failure of a judge to give requested charges to the jury4 or
failure to instruct the jury as to lesser included offenses5 is not reviewable
under rule 1.850. On the other hand, an alleged abuse of discretion by a
judge in failing to credit the defendant with time already served before
sentencing6 or a subsequent confession by a third party to the crime for
which the defendant was convicted' may be raised under the rule.
The prohibition against raising under the rule matters which could
have been reviewed upon direct appeal is not absolute. If an appeal was
difficult or impossible to perfect, as where the public defender refuses to
prosecute an appeal, a post-conviction hearing may be held to determine
the merits of the defendant's allegations. 8 Nevertheless, the bare allega-
tion that an attempted appeal was frustrated is not sufficient to require a
post-conviction hearing to be held; it is essential to allege that reversible
error occurred in the trial.'
Related to the rule that matters subject to direct appeal should not
be brought by motion under rule 1.850 is the holding of Grizzell v. State °
that a motion under the rule will not be entertained during the pendency
of a direct appeal. This principle was extended in Brooks v. State" to the
effect that a motion under the rule will not lie while a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is pending.
B. In-Custody Requirement
Rule 1.850 has been judicially interpreted to restrict the scope of
attack to the sentence being served by the prisoner, with the proviso
that future consecutive sentences may be attacked if the prisoner would
be entitled to be released if he prevailed on his motion.' 2 A motion under
4. Lawson v. State, 215 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
5. Pinkney v. State, 219 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
6. Presha v. State, 216 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
7. Fast v. State, 221 So.2d 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). The denial of the motion was
affirmed on appeal, however, on the ground that it is within the discretion of the trial judge
to reject the confession of a third person.
8. Jackson v. State, 166 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). But cf. Powe v. State, 216 So.2d
446 (Fla. 1968), holding that the matter of a frustrated appeal resulting from the failure of
the trial court to appoint counsel for an indigent should not be heard under rule 1.850 but
by habeas corpus.
9. Rankin v. State, 209 So.2d 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
10. 187 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
11. 209 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
12. Johnson v. State, 185 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1966). Where the prisoner is serving the first
of two consecutive sentences, the principle of immediate release does not preclude an attack
by federal habeas corpus on the sentence currently being served; otherwise a prisoner could
never attack the first of a series of consecutive sentences until he had already served it.
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968).
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the rule is also proper to attack consecutive sentences entered by the same
court, but not where the sentences are entered by different courts.13
The principle of the prisoner's right to be released has also been
applied to past sentences already served. Thus, where the petitioner was
convicted of possession of firearms by a convicted felon under Florida
Statutes section 790.23, he was permitted to attack by rule 1.850 his
original felony conviction (on the basis of the denial of representation by
counsel); for even though the prior sentence had already been served, if
the first conviction could be overturned, his possession of firearms would
not be a crime and he would be entitled to be released. 4 In a similar situ-
ation, the prisoner attacked an enhanced sentence for second offenders
under Florida Statutes section 775.09 because at his first trial he was
without counsel. The lower court denied a hearing because the first
sentence had already been served. The appellate court reversed and
remanded for a hearing with instructions that if the lower court found
the first conviction invalid, then the sentence under Florida Statutes
section 775.09 should be vacated and the sentence imposed for the second
crime be reinstated with credit for time served.'
C. Hearings on Motions Under Rule 1.850
Rule 1.850 provides that the court "shall" grant a hearing on a motion
"unless the motion and the files and the records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." It is thus error to deny
a hearing where the prisoner alleges that his plea of guilty was coerced
by threats of a higher sentence if he were to plead not guilty and where
there is no denial by the state nor refutation by the record of this conten-
tion.16
Despite the affirmative language of the rule requiring a hearing on
a motion unless it is conclusively shown to be without merit, the courts
have evidenced their impatience with frivolous motions" by putting the
burden on the prisoner to make out a prima facie case for relief before
granting an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in Gibson v. State,', it was held
that a naked assertion that a plea of guilty was coerced, without support-
ing factual allegations, was insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.
Similarly, Conyers v. State 9 held that a mere allegation that the state
13. Holstein v. State, 205 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), following Johnson v. State, 185
So.2d 466 (Fla. 1966); Johnson v. State, 184 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
14. Johnson v. State, 203 So.2d 36 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
15. Lee v. State, 217 So.2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
16. Tillman v. State, 203 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
17. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 210 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), wherein the court
suggests that contempt proceedings or even perjury prosecutions might be resorted to in
cases of flagrant abuse of judicial processes by filing capricious and irresponsible petitions for
relief under the rule, citing Nelson v. State, 208 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968), which upheld
an adjudication of contempt in a proceeding under rule 1.850.
18. 213 So.2d 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
19. 215 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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knowingly used perjured testimony, without substantiating facts or docu-
ments, does not require a full evidentiary hearing on the motion.
D. Successive Motions
The rule provides that a court is not required to entertain a motion
which does not differ materially from a prior one; but where the record
did not refute the prisoner's allegation that the state knowingly used
perjured testimony, he was entitled to a hearing on the motion because
it raised issues different from those presented previously on direct ap-
peal.
20
E. Appeal From Rule 1.850 Hearings
When a hearing on a motion under the rule is denied, no evidence is
taken. Consequently, the allegations contained in the motion are taken
as true for purposes of an appeal from a denial of a hearing.2
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Adequate Representation
In the period surveyed, there was recurrent litigation on the question
of whether the appointment of one attorney to represent indigent co-
defendants constitutes a denial of the effective assistance of counsel.
In Baker v. State,22 the Florida Supreme Court laid down the rule
that it is error to deny the requests of indigent codefendants for separate,
independent counsel, regardless of any showing of actual prejudice. The
question then arose whether the lack of separate counsel is so funda-
mental as to require reversal in the absence of a request, and the appellate
courts responded with conflicting answers. The fourth district held
that the error is fundamental and -is not waived by failure to object to
the lack of separate counsel.2" The third district declined to follow this
rule and held that there is no reversible error in the absence of a request.2
The first district agreed. The second district took an intermediate posi-
tion and held that the trial court should appoint separate counsel regard-
less of a request, but that its failure to do so is not reversible error unless
there is actual prejudice.2
Upon a writ of public-interest certiorari, the Supreme Court of
20. Rayburn v. State, 203 So.2d 212 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
21. Bartz v. State, 221 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). The prisoner claimed that his plea
of guilty was coerced. If true, he would be entitled to be released, and a hearing was accord-
ingly ordered.
22. 202 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1967).
23. Youngblood v. State, 206 So.2d 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
24. Belton v. State, 211 So.2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
25. Rogers v. State, 212 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
26. Dunbar v. State, 214 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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Florida in Belton v. State,27 approving the position of the third district,
held that codefendants have the right to separate, independent counsel
when there is an objection or request made during the trial "unless it
can be demonstrated to the trial judge that no prejudice will result or that
no conflict will arise as an incident of joint representation."28 In the ab-
sence of such a request, however, the trial court's "failure to appoint
separate counsel will not be held to constitute error unless it is demon-
strated that prejudice results from such failure. ' 2' The conflict among
the district courts of appeal was then formally laid to rest in State v.
Youngblood,30 wherein the Supreme Court, by review upon conflict
certiorari, reiterated the views expressed in Belton v. State."1
The Baker, Belton, and Youngblood decisions of the Supreme Court
of Florida are not applicable to prior holdings of the district courts of
appeal that joint representation is not error where both codefendants
plead guilty,3 2 or where the codefendants choose joint representation.81
In addition, the rule of Baker v. State3 4 and its progeny is not retroactive
in application.
35
The adequacy of representation was also in issue in Williams v.
State,36 where the petitioner under rule 1.850 alleged that counsel did not
interview him prior to trial. The court held that the competence of coun-
sel is not determined by the amount of time spent on the case. On the
other hand, in Bush v. State,37 where the defendant tried unsuccessfully
to speak to the public defender assigned to handle his case because the
latter was too busy, and then plead guilty at his arraignment, the court
held that the defendant had been deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel.
27. 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968).
28. Id. at 98.
29. Id.
30. 217 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1968), followed by Wilson v. State, 221 So.2d 1 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1969) ; Rushing v. State, 218 So.2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) ; Garner v. State, 218 So.2d 460
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
31. 217 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1968), followed by Baker v. State, 217 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1969) ; Dennis v. State, 217 So.2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
32. Gardner v. State, 214 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; Williams v. State, 214 So.2d
29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); Wellington v. Wainwright, 214 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968);
Mitchell v. State, 213 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). The rationale of these cases is that a
plea of guilty waives a trial, without which there can be no conflicting interests, strategies, or
defenses to prejudice either of the defendants. Logically, this rule should apply to the case
where only one of the codefendants pleads guilty; since only one defendant is tried, counsel
need not sacrifice the interests of one codefendant in order to protect those of the other.
33. Davis v. State, 209 So.2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
34. 202 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1967).
35. Dunbar v. State, 220 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1969). The Florida Supreme Court thus ap-
proved the position of the second district in Dunbar v. State, 214 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1968), and rejected that of the fourth district in Youngblood v. State, 206 So.2d 665 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1968).
36. 215 So.2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
37. 209 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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B. Waiver
The constitutional right to the assistance of counsel may be volun-
tarily waived by the defendant." Nevertheless, a waiver should not be
presumed from the defendant's silence because the right to counsel does
not depend upon request.39 Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a
hearing on his motion under rule 1.850 where the record did not show
whether he was informed of his right to hire counsel at trial." Where,
however, a police officer's testimony that he had informed the defendant
of his constitutional rights by reading a "Miranda card" was disputed,
the court took judicial notice of the contents of the card, although it was
not introduced into evidence.
41
C. Critical Stages
The general rule operative in this area of the law is that deprivation
of the assistance of counsel is not reversible error unless the denial oc-
curred at a critical stage of criminal prosecution or unless there is a
showing of special prejudice to the defendant at a noncritical stage.
1. OUT-OF-CUSTODY INTERROGATION
Where the relator signed a waiver of immunity and testified to
incriminating matters before the grand jury, his later claim that the
waiver was void on the ground that he had not been given the Miranda
warnings was rejected in State ex rel. Lowe v. Nelson.
42 The court held
that Miranda is not applicable to a grand jury hearing because the pro-
ceedings are not conducted in the isolated setting of the police station.
"[T]here are impartial observers to guard against intimidation and
trickery being employed to compel the witness to give evidence against
himself.""
2. IN-CUSTODY INTERROGATION
Arrest is a critical stage of criminal prosecution under the holding
of Miranda, which requires that the police inform the accused of his
right to counsel, inter alia, before they may question him.
4
38. Brumit v. State, 220 So.2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). A waiver of counsel at one
stage of the proceedings does not necessarily imply a waiver at all subsequent stages. See
note 53 infra.
39. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
40. Hamilton v. State, 214 So.2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
41. Tudela v. State, 212 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
42. 202 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
43. Id. at 234-35, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. See Section III, CONFESS OS, pp. 225-30 infra for a discussion of the relationship
between the right to counsel and the admissibility of a confession.
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3. PRELIMINARY HEARING
Generally, the preliminary hearing is not considered a critical stage
of the proceedings in the absence of a special showing of prejudice to the
defendant.48
4. ARRAIGNMENT
The arraignment is not a critical stage of the proceedings unless
prejudice to the defendant is shown. For example, a conviction based
upon a plea of guilty entered at an arraignment without the assistance
of counsel" or without the effective assistance of counsel4 7 will be re-
versed.
5. AFTER FORMAL CHARGE BUT BEFORE TRIAL
Under the rule established in United States v. Wade,48 the line-up is
a critical stage of the proceedings to which the right of counsel attaches.
Wade has been followed in Florida. For example, where, instead of a
physical confrontation, a video tape recording of the defendant was shown
to the victim, the court held that the defendant had the right to the
presence of counsel at such a showing. 9 Wade is not retroactive, however,
and does not affect convictions obtained before it was decided.5" Nor
does it require reversal where the in-court identification is not the product
of the line-up, for example, where the witness observed the defendant at
some other place.5 '
6. SENTENCE
Sentencing is a critical stage of criminal prosecution at which the
defendant has the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.52
Furthermore, a waiver of representation by counsel and entry of a plea of
guilty at the arraignment does not imply a waiver of counsel at the
sentencing stage.53
45. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 208 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
46. Lee v. State, 217 So.2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
47. Bush v. State, 209 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
48. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
49. Cox v. State, 219 So.2d 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
If a person, as here, has been arrested and "booked" and has exercised his rights to
counsel, he is entitled to have counsel present when the video tape recording of
himself is shown to the victim or witnesses as a substitute for a line-up or other
confrontation.
Id. at 765, citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
50. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), cited in Smart v. State, 208 So.2d 866 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1968) ; Bradley v. State, 206 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; Marden v. State, 203
So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
51. Avis v. State, 221 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) ; Anderson v. State, 215 So.2d 618
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) ; Shepard v. State, 213 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
52. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 163 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
53. Wingard v. State, 200 So.2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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7. DIRECT APPEAL
Direct appeal is a critical stage of criminal proceedings.5 4 Accord-
ingly, where the defendant's request for counsel to represent him on ap-
peal was denied and the appeal period had expired, the defendant was
afforded full appellate review by way of habeas corpus.5 Similarly, where
appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw from the case and the ap-
pellate court dismissed the appeal, collateral review under rule 1.850
was ordered. 6 In addition, when the public defender refuses to file a
timely notice of appeal, relief may be had by collateral review under the
rule57 unless an appeal would have been frivolous.5"
Although it is incumbent upon the trial court under rule 1.670 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to advise a defendant of his right to
appeal his conviction, an indigent does not have the absolute right to
the services of counsel for a frivolous appeal.59 Moreover, the burden is
on the defendant, rather than on the trial judge, to indicate his desire to
have counsel represent him on appeal. 60 This is especially true when the
defendant is represented at trial by privately retained counsel, for then
the court may rely upon the presumption, if not rebutted by the de-
fendant, that his own attorney will protect his right to appeal.61 On the
other hand, the failure of an indigent defendant to request the appoint-
ment of counsel to take an appeal is not ipso facto a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right.62 Undoubtedly, the fairest and simplest proce-
dure in this regard would be a statement by the trial court to the con-
victed defendant that he has the right to the assistance of counsel on
appeal:
[I] t now appears highly desirable, if not indispensable, that the
record of the trial proceedings affirmatively reflects that at the
time of the sentencing the trial judge has fully advised the
defendant as to his constitutional right to an appeal if such is
desired, and, if indigent, counsel will be appointed by the court
to represent him on appeal at state expense. 3
54. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), holding that if a state affords ap-
pellate review of a criminal conviction as a matter of right, it is a denial of equal protection
of the laws to refuse to appoint counsel to represent an indigent on his first direct appeal.
55. DeMotte v. State, 203 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), citing Hollingshead v. Wain-
wright, 194 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
56. Walker v. Wainwright, 202 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1967). The Supreme Court of Florida
gave no reason for its preference in this case for review under rule 1.850 rather than by
habeas corpus, which it had ordered on similar facts in the prior case of Hollingshead v.
Wainwright, 194 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1967). Walker does not cite Hollingskead.
57. Coward v. State, 202 So.2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
58. Nelson v. State, 208 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
59. Mobley v. State, 215 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) ; Lee v. State, 204 So.2d 245 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1967).
60. Burchill v. State, 205 So.2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
61. McDaniels v. State, 219 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1969).
62. State ex rel. Miller v. Wainwright, 213 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), citing Swen-
son v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1966); Baker v. Wainwright, 391 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1968).
63. State ex rel. Miller v. Wainwright, 213 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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Although the right to counsel on appeal is not absolute and an at-
orney is not required to prosecute a frivolous appeal, a court-appointed
attorney who files an appeal may not simply dismiss it later. The 
United
States Supreme Court case of Anders v. California
6 4 requires that counsel
first submit to the court a brief of all points which might arguably 
support
the appeal and supply a copy to the defendant."
An application for leave to withdraw should be addressed to 
the
appellate court wherein the appeal is lodged. Thus, in Smith 
v. State,6 6 it
was held that an order by the trial court granting counsel leave 
to with-
draw was a nullity for want of jurisdiction since the appellate 
court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
8. COLLATERAL ATTACK
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that there is no absolute
right to counsel on a motion for post-conviction relief under 
rule 1.850,67
but where the assistance of counsel is essential to a competent 
presenta-
tion of the motion, counsel should be appointed for an 
indigent."
Similarly, there is no absolute right to the assistance of counsel 
to appeal
an order denying relief sought under rule 1.850,69 but where the 
petition
appears meritorious or where the interests of justice require 
it, counsel
may be appointed in the discretion of the court."
°
9. PROBATION AND PAROLE HEARINGS
While probation and parole hearings are not critical stages per 
se,
a hearing to determine whether probation should be revoked 
and the de-
fendant sentenced is a critical stage under the rule of Mempa 
v. Rhay."1
Therefore, the denial of assistance of counsel at such a hearing 
subjects
the entire proceeding to collateral attack under rule 1.850.12
64. 386 U.S. 738 (1967), followed by Herzig v. State, 200 So.2d 632 (Fla. 
4th Dist. 1967).
65. This procedure is desirable for reasons of justice and judicial 
efficiency because it
provides the court with specific legal criteria in determining whether 
the appeal lacks merit
and whether counsel should therefore be permitted to dismiss the 
appeal and withdraw from
the case. Thus, even if it is ultimately decided that the appeal is without 
merit, the defendant
will at least have had a preliminary opportunity to be heard by the 
court. See Lee v. State,
204 So.2d 245 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
66. 208 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
67. Harper v. State, 201 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1967).
68. Id. See Hawkins v. State, 221 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
69. State v. Herzig, 208 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1968), citing State v. Weeks, 166 
So.2d 892 (Fla.
1964), which held that the Douglas requirement of counsel on direct 
appeal does not apply to
an appeal from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief 
under rule 1 (now rule
1.850).
70. State v. Herzig, 208 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1968). See Hawkins v. State, 221 
So.2d 198 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1969).
71. 389 U.S. 128 (1967), followed by Gargan v. State, 217 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. 1969).
72. Herrington v. State, 207 So.2d 323 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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D. Juvenile Courts
In Steinhauer v. State,7 3 the Third District Court of Appeal extended
the holding of In re GaultT and held that a hearing at which a juvenile
who is charged with the commission of a crime waives the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is a critical stage of criminal prosecution to which
the constitutional right of counsel attaches. The Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the case for its retroactive application of Gault, "although in
futuro the assistance of counsel at such a hearing is required. . .
E. Offenses Less Than Felonies
The Supreme Court of Florida has not receded from the position
first announced in Fish v. State 6 that the right to counsel does not extend
to indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors.
III. CONFESSIONS
On its face, Miranda v. Arizona7 7 has revolutionalized the law of
confessions by extending the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel to the arrest stage.7' The Florida courts, however, have
73. 206 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
74. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
75. State v. Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214, 218 (Fla. 1968), citing Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966). Under Johnson, the test for the retroactivity of a newly articulated
constitutional right is whether it affects the integrity of the fact-finding process. Since a
waiver hearing is not a proceeding on the merits but determines jurisdiction only, the Johnson
test is not met. See generally Comment, Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court as Monday Morning Quarterback, 23 MIAMi L. REv. 139 (1969).
In Richardson v. State ex rel. Mitton, 219 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), however, the
third district refused to apply Gault retroactively to a juvenile court delinquency proceeding,
which, unlike a waiver hearing, is a proceeding on the merits. A good discussion of the whole
problem is provided by the well-reasoned dissent of Judge Swann.
76. 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a contrary
position in McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965), and Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). The former case involved a misdemeanor in the State of Florida,
in which the federal court ordered the release of the defendant because he was not represented
by counsel. Since the Florida courts refuse to recognize the right of counsel in misdemeanor
trials, there arises the bizarre specter of state misdemeanants obtaining instant relief by fed-
eral habeas corpus, thus effectively nullifying the state proceedings.
77. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda holds that an accused in the custody of the police
must be informed of the constitutional right to remain silent; that anything he says may be
used in evidence against him; and that he has the right to the assistance of counsel at the
interrogation, and if indigent, to have counsel appointed to represent him at state expense.
Moreover, the police may not question the accused on any matter unless he has voluntarily
waived these rights.
78. The holding of Miranda was foreshadowed by the case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), which held that the right to counsel applies at the police station when an
investigation ceases to be general in nature and begins to "focus in" on the defendant. Al-
though it is still a viable case, Escobedo has been largely superseded by and incorporated into
Miranda, which remains the definitive exposition of the constitutional limitations on police
interrogation.
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stoutly resisted79 the acceptance of these principles and in general dis-
tinguish Miranda whenever possible and continue to hold confessions
admissible if they are otherwise voluntary.
A. Right to Counsel and Right to Be Silent
The constitutional rights enunciated by Miranda do not attach
until there is custodial interrogation of the defendant by the police. Ac-
cordingly, voluntary statements by a defendant prior to arrest, 0 or by
a codefendant at the scene of arrest,81 or immediately after arrest but
before questioning by the officer,8 2 are admissible. Similarly, when an
accused blurts out "I did it" in the midst of being advised by the officer
of his constitutional rights, the confession is admissible.8" In all such
cases, the rationale is that spontaneous statements made by an accused
who is under arrest, i.e., in custody, but who has not yet been questioned,
are not the product of custodial interrogation but are voluntary and thus
not subject to the exclusionary rule of Miranda.
For the same reasons, an inculpatory statement made in a phone
call placed from jail by the accused is not rendered inadmissible by the
fact that it was overheard by a police officer. 4 Neither a recorded con-
versation obtained by an undercover agent who poses as a fence to buy
stolen property from the defendant, 5 nor a written statement obtained
from the defendant by another inmate of the prison (a trustee who
turned it over to the authorities) is excluded from evidence under
Miranda."5 In the foregoing cases, the exclusionary rule of Miranda is not
applicable because the incriminating statements were neither compelled
nor extracted by a process of custodial interrogation.
79. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 203 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). In its first opinion in the
case, 197 So.2d 574, the second district conceded that Miranda was not per se applicable to
the case because it was decided prior to Collins' trial, and Miranda was held not to be retro-
active in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). The court had, however, applied the
rationale of Miranda on the theory that it was merely a logical extension of Escobedo, which
was decided prior to Collins' trial and was therefore applicable to it. The case was reversed
and remanded by the Supreme Court of Florida for "clarification" of the opinion. State v.
Collins, 201 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1967). Accordingly, the second district modified its opinion by
deleting the sole reference to Miranda. As a practical matter, of course, this accomplished
nothing but a change in the theoretical basis of the reversal of the conviction. The signif-
icance of this action by the second district, apparently taken under pressure from the Supreme
Court of Florida, is a manifestation of the supreme court's hostility to Miranda and its
corresponding desire to give the case as little currency as possible. In this regard, see Wills,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 240, 250 (1967).
80. Traber v. State, 212 So.2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
81. Clark v. State, 207 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
82. Cameron v. State, 214 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); Battles v. State, 208 So.2d
150 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
83. Hawkins v. State, 217 So.2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (citing Miranda for the prop-
osition that any statement given freely and voluntarily by the accused is admissible).
84. Sosa v. State, 215 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1968).
85. Parnell v. State, 218 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
86. Holston v. State, 208 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1968). The court did not intimate whether the
result might be different if the prisoner-trustee had acted as an agent of the police to secure
a confession.
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On the other hand, a confession is inadmissible when the Miranda
warnings are not given and the defendant is subjected to interrogation
while he is in the custody of the police . 7 Thus, once within the context of
custodial interrogation, the police must advise the suspect of his consti-
tutional rights in order for his statements to be admissible. Moreover, the
accused must be fully informed of his rights; a warning of the right to
remain silent without a warning of the right to have counsel before ques-
tioning and of the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed at
state expense is insufficient. s8 In addition, the burden is on the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant was fully advised of his constitutional
rights prior to interrogation.8 9
Glover v. State9" held that the critical date for the application of the
Miranda rules is the time the confession is used, not when it was given.
Thus, in that case, a confession obtained before the Miranda decision but
used at a post-Miranda trial was held inadmissible.
Although the burden is on the state to prove that the Miranda warn-
ings were in fact given to the accused, a defendant is not entitled, as a
matter of law, to have a dispute on the issue of warnings resolved in his
favor.9' Thus, in Tudela v. State,92 the court rejected the defendant's
claim that the officer did not fully advise him of his constitutional rights
and accepted the officer's testimony that he had read the warnings from
a Miranda card. 93 Although the card was not put into evidence, the court
took judicial notice that such cards contain a complete list of the required
warnings.
B. Illegal Detention-Interrogation
The case of Outten v. State,94 discussed in the last survey, reached
the Florida Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court's ruling of in-
admissibility of the confession. 5 The court's rationale was that moving
the defendant to a different part of the jail, where he was informed of his
constitutional rights, dissipated the taint of the first illegal confession and
rendered the second one voluntary and therefore admissible.
In Biglow v. State,96 the defendant was put in jail and at first refused
87. Jimenez v. State, 208 So.2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). In this case the custodial inter-
rogation occurred in the defendant's own home.
88. Craig v. State, 216 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); Abram v. State, 216 So.2d 498
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
89. Woods v. State, 211 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
90. 203 So.2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
91. Foreman v. State, 213 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1968).
92. 212 So.2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
93. A similar dispute was also resolved in the officer's favor in Herdzik v. State, 214
So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). This continuing problem of credibility prompts the thought
that Miranda may have accomplished no more than to shift the focus of the swearing con-
test from the voluntariness of the confession to the voluntariness of the waiver.
94. 197 So.2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
95. State v. Outten, 206 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1968).
96. 205 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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to speak to the detectives investigating the case. He was advised of some
of his constitutional rights but not that any statements he made could
be used against him. Finally, he asked to speak to a detective and con-
fessed. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed, the court holding that
the confession was not given as a result of the custody but was entirely
voluntary.
7
In a flagrant case of unlawful police action, the defendant was kept
in custody for four days during which time police interrogated him in an
attempt to secure a confession. The defendant was driven around in a
police car and subjected to elaborate trickery, such as a bogus attack
simulated by fireworks, in order to frighten him. Because the defendant
did not confess until twelve hours after this incident, the Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that the misconduct of the police had not induced
the confession and that the defendant's constitutional rights had not,
therefore, been violated."
C. Voluntary
In the light of Miranda, voluntariness properly refers to the waiver
of the constitutional rights of which an accused is informed. The waiver,
however, need not be express; 99 if, after arrest, an accused is given all the
Miranda warnings, his subsequent confession, voluntarily made, waives
his constitutional rights and is admissible into evidence.' 0
A plea of guilty is tantamount to a judicial confession. Therefore,
the fact that a voluntary confession is obtained under circumstances
which might render it inadmissible, i.e., the absence of counsel, does not
preclude a conviction where the defendant subsequently enters a volun-
tary plea of guilty on the advice of counsel."°' Moreover, the voluntari-
ness of a plea of guilty is determined independently of that of a confession.
Thus, the fact that the defendant had previously confessed cannot be said
to have induced or rendered involuntary a subsequent plea of guilty en-
tered on the advice of counsel.0 2
D. Use of Confessions at Trial
The problem of the use of a confession which implicates a codefen-
dant at a joint trial has engendered much litigation. The traditional view
97. The court cited Davidson v. United States, 371 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1966), for the
proposition that any confession made without solicitation is voluntary and concluded, there-
fore, that even those warnings which were given by the detective were unnecessary.
98. Schneble v. State, 201 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1967). The case was decided with reference to
Escobedo. Amazingly, the court stated its belief that the conviction would be valid even
under the principles of Miranda.
99. Colebrook v. State, 205 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
100. Rolison v. State, 202 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Brisbon v. State, 201 So.2d
832 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
101. Hield v. State, 201 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
102. Camacho v. State, 203 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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was that the granting of a motion for severance is discretionary and that
use of such a confession is permissible so long as a cautionary instruction
is given to the jury that the confession be considered only against its
maker, and not against the nonconfessing defendant. 10 3 Even where the
cautionary instruction is not given, there is no reversible error if the
defendant fails to object." 4
Now, however, this area of the law is governed by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Bruton v. United States,"5 which held that
the use of the confession of one defendant at a joint trial violates the
sixth-amendment right of confrontation of the other defendant. Accord-
ingly, the use of a confession of a codefendant, even with a cautionary
instruction, was held to be error in Schneble v. State,'0 6 Cappetta v.
State, °' and Branch v. State.10 The result is that the confession must be
totally excluded or the codefendants must have separate trials in order
to preserve the right of confrontation of a nonconfessing defendant.'
Bruton was extended in Gelis v. State1. to cover statements of a
codefendant made at trial. It was held that if one defendant makes a
statement about his own involvement which would have been inadmissi-
ble against the codefendant were the latter tried alone, a severance must
be granted, whether or not one is requested.
Once a confession is given and its voluntariness is put into issue, the
better procedure is to hear evidence on the issue out of the presence of
the jury; but if the defendant does not object to the jury's presence, it is
not reversible error."' Even where the request is made and denied, the
defendant's subsequent testimony as to the same facts contained in the
confession renders the error, if any, harmless."
2
Another problem in the area of the law is the use at trial of inad-
missible confessions, not for their truth, but for purposes of impeachment.
Ordinarily, an involuntary confession may not be so used, 1 3 but where
the defendant took the stand and his prior statements to the police were
elicited by his own counsel, the defendant had opened the door and cross-
examination by the prosecutor was proper." 4 The question of the use for
impeachment of a statement which is voluntary and otherwise admissible
except for the fact that Miranda warnings were not given was before the
103. Colebrook v. State, 205 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
104. Grace v. State, 206 So.2d 225 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
105. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Bruton was held to be retroactive in application and binding
upon the states through the fourteenth amendment in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
106. 392 U.S. 298 (1968), vacating and remanding to the Florida Supreme Court, which
reversed. Schneble v. State, 215 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1968).
107. 218 So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
108. 212 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
109. Id.
110. 215 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
111. Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
112. Mathew v. State, 209 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
113. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850, 130 So. 582 (Fla. 1930).
114. Kiraly v. State, 212 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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Florida Supreme Court in State v. Galasso."5 Although the court chose
to align itself with those cases" 6 which exclude "tainted" statements for
all purposes, it held that on the facts of the case the error was innocuous
and did not require reversal.
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
When applying to a magistrate for a search warrant, the supporting
affidavits must set forth the facts constituting probable cause and not
merely conclusory allegations. 117 The reliability of the facts set forth,
however, may be inferred from all the circumstances; it is thus not a
fatal defect to fail to allege that the informant is reliable." 8
A search warrant must describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized with particularity; a warrant which is vague in terms
and leaves discretion to the executing officer is void as a general warrant." 9
Nevertheless, a warrant to search a named building and "all persons
therein who shall be connected with, or suspected of being connected
with . . . gambling. . . ." was held sufficiently specific.12 ° On the other
hand, a warrant authorizing the search of an entire building, containing
a pool room and dwelling units upstairs, was deemed too general, in the
absence of a showing by the state that it had no reason to believe the
building contained multiple units.' 2 '
In the execution of an arrest warrant, the officer must first announce
his purpose and seek peaceful entry before pushing his way into a
room.' 22 This is not necessary, however, when the accused's living quar-
ters are visible from his place of business which is a store open to the
public.
2 3
A search warrant must be executed only for the seizure of the articles
described therein; it may not be used as a ruse for an exploratory
search.'24 But if the officers discover stolen property in the course of a
fruitless search with a warrant for lottery paraphenalia, they may seize
that property and arrest its possessor. 23
It is well established in the law of search and seizure that no warrant
115. 217 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1968).
116. See, e.g., Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Jones v. State,
200 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967). Contra, State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279
(1968) ; May v. State, 211 So.2d 845 (Miss. 1968).
117. Parnell v. State, 204 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
118. Ludwig v. State, 215 So.2d 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
119. State v. Cook, 213 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
120. Id. at 19.
121. Fance v. State, 207 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
122. Urquhart v. State, 211 So.2d 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
123. Hutchinson v. State, 201 So.2d 485 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
124. Urquhart v. State, 211 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
125. Hall v. State, 219 So.2d 757 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). The principle is the same with
respect to a consensual search without a warrant. Thus, where police officers without a war-
rant sought and were granted permission to enter and search for stolen property, the
marijuana that they discovered during the course of the search was admissible into evidence.
Diaz v. State, 206 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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is necessary to authorize a search made incident to a lawful arrest. There
is the problem, however, of determining what is "incident" to the arrest,
i.e., reasonably related in time and scope. This, in turn, depends to a
large extent on the area or place that is to be searched. Special restrictions
apply to limit the permissible scope of a search of a private dwelling
house made without a warrant but incident to an arrest.126 Thus, where
the defendant was arrested upon alighting from his car in his driveway,
the warrantless search of his house could not be justified as incident to
the arrest.
127
Where the defendant is arrested for having an improperly licensed
vehicle, objects discovered during the course of an inventory of the car's
contents are admissible into evidence.12 Similarly, where the defendant
was being questioned in the police station after arrest, and his car was
parked outside the station, the police search of the car a few minutes after
the arrest was incident to an arrest for a crime.
129
Where, at the scene of a crime, the officer saw a radio in plain sight
on the seat of the car and could have lawfully seized it at that time, his
subsequent seizure of the radio was not rendered unlawful by his failure
to get a warrant; the seizure was still closely connected to the prior arrest
of the defendant. 3 ° A warrant is also unnecessary for an officer to inves-
tigate an emergency. 131
A gun 32 or other evidence 3 discovered as a result of a search of a
126. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and its companion case, Von Cleef
v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969). Chimel holds that a warrantless search of the defendant's
entire house upon an arrest of the defendant in his house on a burglary charge is unreason-
able in scope and thus unconstitutional. Chimel reviews the case law on the issue and con-
cludes that there are only two justifications for a warrantless search incident to an arrest:
the removal of weapons from the person arrested; and the seizure of evidence to prevent its
concealment or destruction by the person arrested. Accordingly, the sphere of permissible
search is circumscribed by the area "within his immediate control." Id. at 764. A search which
extends beyond that perimeter is unlawful unless judicially authorized by a search warrant.
The Von Cleef case, a per curiam decision, is illustrative of the same principle.
127. Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969). Shipley, decided the same day as Chimel
and Von Cleef, holds that "a search 'can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'"
Id. at 819, quoting Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964) (emphasis supplied by
Shipley).
128. Knight v. State, 212 So.2d 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; cf. Gagnon v. State, 212 So.2d
337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), where the defendant was stopped for traffic violations and the police
impounded his car for lack of proof of ownership. The search of the car was upheld as
incident to an arrest for a crime.
129. Sessions v. State, 213 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), citing Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58 (1967).
130. Avis v. State, 221 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) ; cf. Chance v. State, 202 So.2d
825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), where the officer stopped the defendant's car and observed evidence
of a crime through a window. He then drew his gun, handcuffed the defendant, and searched
the car. The court held that the arrest was not effected at the moment the officer stopped the
car, but at the time that the defendant was handcuffed. Therefore, there was probable cause
to arrest based on the officer's observation of the contents of the car.
131. Webster v. State, 201 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
132. Echols v. State, 201 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
133. Williams v. State, 210 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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person lawfully arrested for vagrancy is admissible into evidence at trial.
The same is true of the discovery of a match box of marijuana upon a
person arrested for public drunkenness.'3 4 Even where the defendant was
arrested for "prowling" and later tried for rape, the evidence was admissi-
ble because the arrest was valid, i.e., based upon probable cause, although
it was mislabeled. 3 5
An arrest can be constructive detention. Thus, a legal arrest and
search occurred where the officers informed the defendant that she was
under arrest for possession of stolen goods but left her at home to take
care of her small children until the following day. 3 '
A lawful arrest for carrying a concealed weapon can be made by
municipal police, acting outside of their jurisdictional territory, in the
capacity of private citizens arresting for a breach of the peace." 7
Probable cause to arrest can be supplied by second-hand informa-
tion. Thus, where a description of a robber was relayed over the police
radio, the officer had probable cause to arrest a person fitting that de-
scription. 3 ' Similarly, there was probable cause to arrest when a motel
switch-board operator overheard the defendant's calls and reported them
to the police." 9 The court further stated that this was not an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy because the fourth amendment applies only to
governmental action, not to that of private citizens. 4 '
In Baker v. State, 4 ' the defendant wrote a letter which indicated
his guilt. The letter was intercepted by the jailor and used as evidence
at trial. The court, by way of obiter dictum, 14 2 stated that the seizure of
the letter was not illegal because it was part of the regular security mea-
sures of the jail's operation. Nor was it an unlawful invasion of privacy
for an undercover agent, posing as a fence so that he could buy stolen
property from the defendant, to record the contents of the conversation
for use as evidence at trial. Since the officer had been a party to the con-
versation, his testimony was based on first-hand knowledge, and the tape
served merely as corroborative evidence of the incriminating statements
which were spoken freely by the defendant.
14 3
In order to raise the issue of an unlawful search' 4 or an arrest with-
134. Farmer v. State, 208 So.2d 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). The court failed to raise the
issue of the scope of the search, i.e., whether it was reasonable in the context of an arrest for
drunkenness.
135. Hoskins v. State, 208 So.2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
136. State v. Parnell, 221 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1969).
137. Marden v. State, 203 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
138. Wells v. State, 203 So.2d 199 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), citing Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
139. Bateh v. State, 208 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
140. Id.
141. 202 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1967).
142. The court reversed the conviction on other grounds.
143. Parnell v. State, 218 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), citing Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
144. Kelley v. State, 202 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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out probable cause, 145 a motion to suppress must be made before trial.
A motion to suppress at trial may be entertained when there is no oppor-
tunity to so move before trial or where it appears from the face of the
warrant or uncontroverted facts that the search or seizure was unlawful
as a matter of law.'
46
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
In McKee v. State, ' the Child Molester Act, Florida Statutes chap-
ter 801, was held valid.
In Johnson v. State,4 ' the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the con-
stitutionality of the vagrancy statute, Florida Statutes section 856.02.
The defendant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which
reversed his conviction, without passing on the statute's constitutionality,
for failure of the state to prove an actual violation of the statute.
4 '
In Hilliard v. City of Gainesville,5 ' the constitutionality of a muni-
cipal ordinance prohibiting driving while intoxicated was alleged to be in
violation of Florida Statutes section 317.043, which forbids the enact-
ment of municipal ordinances which are in conflict with state statutes.
Although the ordinance provided for a penalty different from that of
the statute, it was held not to be in conflict with the statute and was
therefore upheld.
In a rather unusual case, a prisoner in a federal penitentiary in
Kansas sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Court of
Gadsen County to initiate proceedings to have him returned to Florida
to stand trial for a charge of violating a Florida statute. It was held that
one who is accused of crime in Florida and who is in the custody of an-
other sovereign has the right, under section 11 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution and under Florida Statutes section
915.02, to demand that Florida seek his return in order to afford him a
speedy trial. 5'
VI. THE ACCUSED As A WITNESS
Florida Statutes section 918.09 prohibits the prosecution from com-
menting upon a defendant's failure to testify,'
52 but a comment will not
145. Law v. State, 204 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
146. Kelley v. State, 202 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
147. 203 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1967).
148. 202 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1967).
149. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968), citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960). See notes 357 and 358 infra and accompanying text.
150. 213 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1968).
151. Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967). Section 915.02 of the Florida
statutes provides for a speedy trial for an accused who is serving a prison term.
152. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1967) provides as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness
in his own behalf, and shall in such cases be subject to examination as other wit-
nesses, but no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself,
nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment
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be reviewed on appeal in the absence of an objection by the defendant.'53
The application of the statute, moreover, often involves a delicate inter-
pretation of the language used by the prosecution in order to determine
whether the reference is a prohibited one. Thus, in Williams v. State, '
4
the prosecutor's statement that "the defense counsel for Jesse Williams
having put on no testimony or evidence is entitled to opening . . . and
. . . closing statement" was held not to be a comment prohibited by
Florida Statutes section 918.09.155
The proscription of the statute has also been applied to the trial
judge by the Florida Supreme Court, which held it to be reversible error
for the judge to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify. 6'
Nevertheless, it is proper for the judge to instruct the jury not to indulge
in a presumption unfavorable to the defendant because he did not tes-
tify. 17
VII. APPEAL
The state may not appeal from an oral order quashing an informa-
tion, even though it has been docketed in the Minute Book of the Clerk,
because such oral order is not a formal entry of judgment."5'
In a case which was reviewed by public-interest certiorari, the Florida
Supreme Court held that when the state takes an appeal from an inter-
locutory order, the defendant may file a cross-assignment of error attack-
ing the same order.159
An unusual factual situation was presented in Simmons v. State
160
when the responsible state officials were unable to produce the trial tran-
script because the court reporter had died after the trial and his notes
were illegible. The usual procedures for correction or supplementation
on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf, and a defendant offering
no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding
argument before the jury.
153. State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967). Jones reversed the prior decisional law
which held that a prohibited comment was fundamental error which thus required no objec-
tion. See notes 167 and 168 infra and accompanying text.
154. 200 So.2d 636 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
155. Id. at 637-38. The prosecutor also referred to the fact that the State's evidence was
not controverted by the defendant. Id. at 638.
156. Diecidue v. State, 131 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1961).
157. Edwards v. State, 216 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; cf. Bridges v. State, 207 So.2d
48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), where the judge mistakenly charged the jury that the defendant had
testified. The court was then apprised of its error and gave a cautionary charge to the jury
not to draw any unfavorable inference from the defendant's failure to testify. The appellate
court found no reversible error.
158. State v. Malone, 215 So.2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); accord, State v. Shedaker,
190 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), holding that the time for filing a notice of appeal does
not commence to run until the entry of a written order. Contra, Gosset v. State, 188 So.2d
836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
159. State v. McKinney, 212 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1968).
160. 200 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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of the record161 or agreement by the parties to a condensed form"' were
inapplicable, so a new trial was ordered in lieu of the appeal.
Several recent cases deal with the question of jurisdiction. Where the
defendant was charged with grand larceny but convicted by the jury in
the circuit court of a misdemeanor-the unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle-the district court of appeal had appellate jurisdiction. Although
appeals in misdemeanor cases ordinarily go to the circuit court from a
subordinate court, if the circuit court properly had trial jurisdiction in the
first instance, any appeal arising from the circuit court prosecution and
conviction goes properly to the district court. 6 '
In order to perfect appellate jurisdiction, the defendant must file a
separate notice of appeal for each conviction. Thus, where the defendant
was convicted of charges contained in three separate informations which
had been consolidated for trial and filed only one notice of appeal, he
could appeal only one conviction and was given thirty days in which to
elect the one for appeal. 6
The filing of a notice of appeal confers complete jurisdiction on the
appellate court. Thus, if a notice of appeal is filed while a motion for a
new trial is still pending, the trial court should strike the motion because
the appellate court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 165
Alleged errors with respect to the admission of evidence will not
be considered on appeal in the absence of a timely objection at trial,
even where the defendant is not represented by counsel, unless the error
is fundamental or jurisdictional.'66 A similar rule prevailed in regard to
comments by the prosecution on the defendant's failure to testify, i.e.,
a timely objection at trial was necessary to preserve the alleged error
for appeal. This rule was qualified by an exception for fundamental
errors, the taint of which could not be dispelled by an instruction from
the judge even if an objection were made. In State v. Jones,67 however,
the Supreme Court of Florida abolished this exception on the inapposite
basis of the right to counsel guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright.'6
There is a conflict of authority in regard to an appeal taken on the
issue of the insufficiency of the evidence. Wilson v. State'69 held that a
161. FLA. APP. R. 6.9(d) (1962).
162. FLA. APP. R. 6.7(f) (1962).
163. Wright v. State, 216 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
164. Bass v. State, 215 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
165. Sosa v. State, 215 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1968).
166. Fitzgerald v. State, 203 So.2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
167. 204 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1967).
168. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Jones is deficient in judicial craftsmanship for two reasons.
First, the presence or absence of counsel is totally irrelevant to a justification of the excep-
tion because the exception applied only to those remarks that were "ineradicable from the
minds of the jury." For such remarks, of course, objection would be futile, and the law
should not require purposeless action. Second, the abolition of the exception was gratuitous in
that it was unnecessary to a disposition of the case: the court concluded that the prosecutor's
remark was not a comment upon the defendant's failure to testify.
169. 221 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to raising the issue on appeal.
Wright v. State,'7 0 on the other hand, held that a motion for a new trial is
not an indispensable prerequisite so long as the alleged insufficiency of
evidence is included in the assignments of error.
17 1
In the period surveyed, there were several cases litigated on the issue
of the failure of trial counsel to appeal the defendant's conviction. In
Schaeffer v. Wainwright, 72 the issue presented was whether a defendant
whose privately retained counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal
could obtain relief by habeas corpus on the basis of the trial court's failure
to appoint counsel to take an appeal. The court denied relief, holding that
it may be assumed that a defendant's privately retained attorney will pro-
tect his client's right to appeal in the absence of a showing that the de-
fendant notified the court of his desire to appeal.
The rule is otherwise with respect to appointed counsel. In Platt v.
Wainwright,173 the defendant's court-appointed attorney failed to file a
timely notice of appeal. The defendant had unsuccessfully sought relief
under rule 1.850 and had thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The federal district court then held that counsel was incompetent
in the post-trial state for failure to file a timely notice of appeal, and that
the petitioner must be granted a new trial unless afforded an opportunity
to raise on collateral attack all issues which would have been open to him
on appealY.14 The Florida Second District Court of Appeal responded by
ordering a hearing on the habeas corpus petition, which it found to be
without merit."
5
Similarly, in Williams v. Wainwright,"6 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that full appellate review could be had by way of habeas
corpus where direct appeal was no longer available because the petitioner
had not received timely notice that his court-appointed counsel had been
permitted to withdraw from the case after trial.
In the foregoing cases which deal with the failure of counsel to effect
appellate review for the defendant, the underlying issue of whether there
is an absolute right to appeal a conviction is not squarely met.17 7 The first
district had once implied the existence of such an absolute right by order-
ing the appointment of counsel to represent on appeal a defendant who
had waived counsel and plead guilty at trial. 7 1 In Robertson v. State,"7 9
170. 216 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
171. The decision was based upon FLA. App. R. 6.16(b) (1962), which provides that
"[u]pon an appeal by the defendant from the judgment the appellate court shall review the
evidence to determine if it is insufficient to support the judgment where this is a ground of
appeal."
172. 218 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1969).
173. 208 So.2d 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
174. The order of the federal district court appears in full in 208 So.2d at 667.
175. 208 So.2d 666 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
176. 217 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1969).
177. The Supreme Court of the United States has never held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires a state to afford appellate review to persons convicted
of crime. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
178. De Motte v. State, 203 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
179. 219 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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however, the first district chose to retreat from that position and to follow
its own subsequent decision in Pierson v. State80 and the fourth district
case of Nelson v. State,'8' which held that an attorney is not required to
file a frivolous appeal and that "some error that is at least arguable as to
its merits must be shown in the motion before relief should be granted on
a constitutional ground such as the failure of defense counsel to appeal."' 82
VIII. BAIL
Section 9 of the Florida Declaration of Rights provides that "all
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses
where the proof is evident or the presumption great." In Nix v. McCal-
lister, '8 the defendant who was charged with first-degree murder was
admitted to bail upon a writ of habeas corpus after his trial resulted in a
mistrial. The court stated the rule that a mistrial does not ipso facto estab-
lish that the accused is entitled to bail, but is merely one factor to be
considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion. Bail should not be
denied, however, where the evidence is wholly circumstantial; it is proper
to deny bail only if the evidence of guilt is so strong as to exclude every
hypothesis other than guilt.
8 4
The situation is different with respect to bail pending appeal. Here,
the "right" to appeal is subject to many qualifications. Thus, it is not an
abuse of discretion to deny bail pending appeal where the appeal is
frivolous and for the purpose of delay,'85 or where the defendant might
flee the jurisdiction. 86 On the other hand, Waller v. State'8' held that bail
should not be denied on the mere possibility that the accused might com-
mit a similar offense if freed on bail, because it is too remote a contingency
and not within the standards of judicial action laid down by Younghans v.
State. 8 Boatright v. State,'89 however, is to the contrary, apparently
180. 214 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
181. 208 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
182. 214 So.2d at 19. In regard to frivolous appeals, Judge Barns suggests in Coleman v.
State, 215 So.2d 96 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) and Nobley v. State, 215 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1968) that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure be amended to permit counsel to file
with the trial court a notice of intention not to appeal, setting forth the reasons therefore,
with a copy to the defendant.
183. 202 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
184. Id.
185. Dawkins v. State, 205 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
186. Younghans v. State, 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
187. 208 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
188. 90 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1956) ; cf. Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 37 (1968):
The idea that it would be 'dangerous' in general to allow the applicant to be at
large must-if it is ever a justifiable ground for denying bail . . .- relate to some
kind of danger that so jeopardizes the public that the only way to protect against it
would be to keep the applicant in jail. Id. at 38.
The 1969 General Session of the Florida Legislature has enacted three important restric-
tions on hail pending appeal, Fla. Laws 1969, chs. 69-1,-2,-307; for a discussion of these
new provisions, see Section XXVIII, LEOISLATION, pp. 260-63 infra.
189. 213 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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holding that bail pending appeal may be denied if it is likely that the
defendant will commit further offenses.
Where an order, pursuant to a motion under rule 1.850, which grants
a new trial is pending appeal to the district court, the trial court retains
jurisdiction to grant bail.'9 0
IX. CHARGE TO THE JURY
Florida Statutes section 919.16 requires that the court charge the
jury that it may convict the defendant of any offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. Nevertheless, judicial application of the
statute consistently holds that the failure of the court to charge the jury
as to lesser-included offenses is not reversible error where the defendant
makes no request for such instructions. 9' Furthermore, the defendant
must submit written requested instructions and object if they are refused
in order to preserve the error for appeal.
9 2
It had formerly been held in Brown v. State198 that even where the
defendant requested a charge on the lesser-included offense, it was not
error to refuse the request where no evidence was presented as to such
lesser offense. The case reached the Florida Supreme Court'9 4 and was
reversed on the basis that Florida Statutes section 919.16 permits a jury
to convict a defendant of any offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged and therefore requires the court to so instruct, regardless
of whether such lesser-included offenses are charged or proved at trial.'95
Although Brown contains the definitive exposition of the law in regard to
jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, the supreme court had pre-
viously reached the same result in Hand v. State,9 ' wherein it was held
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could
190. State v. Clayton, 214 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
191. Simmons v. State, 214 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Jerry v. State, 213 So.2d 440
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; Burkhead v. State, 206 So.2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
192. Blatch v. State, 216 So.2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Egantoff v. State, 208 So.2d 843
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
193. 191 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
194. 206 So.2d 377 (1968). Certiorari was granted because of conflict with Jimenez v.
State, 158 Fla. 719, 30 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1947).
195. The court further held that the trial judge must similarly instruct as to crimes
divisible into degrees and as to attempts to commit crimes which themselves constitute sub-
stantive offenses. The court also stated that counsel's requested instructions should he in
writing.
196. 199 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1967), followed by Little v. State, 203 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1967). The first district expressed reluctance to follow Hand in Griffin v. State, 202 So.2d 602
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1967), and Adams v. State, 201 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, it in effect ignored Hand in Rafuse v. State, 209 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1968), where a defendant charged with assault with intent to commit murder was refused a
requested instruction on assault and battery. The court's rationale was that since a deadly
weapon was used, "there is no evidentiary basis in the record which would support a convic-
tion of assault and battery." Id. at 261. This is in direct conflict with the mandate of Hand
that the requested instructions be given regardless of whether there is an evidentiary basis to
support a conviction of a lesser included offense.
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consider the evidence to determine if the defendants charged with robbery
were guilty of the necessarily lesser-included offense of larceny.
As stated above, a lesser-included offense is one which is necessarily
included in the offense charged, i.e., one which contains all the essential
elements constituting the major offense. The coextensiveness of the ele-
ments of the major and minor offenses was in issue in McCullers v.
State, 97 wherein the defendant claimed that it was error for the judge to
charge the jury that aggravated assault was a lesser-included offense of
manslaughter by culpable negligence, the offense charged. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction by a process of impressive mental gymnas-
tics, reasoning that a car is a dangerous weapon (the "aggravated" ele-
ment) and that the general intent necessary to commit an assault can be
subsumed under reckless indifference to human life.
Miscellaneous cases on jury instructions in the period surveyed in-
clude decisions that an instruction on alibi is warranted if the evidence
raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's presence, although it does
not preclude the possibility, 9 " and that an instruction that the offense
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt instead of every reasonable
doubt is not error. 199
X. SENTENCE
In State v. Fitz," the defendant was convicted of attempting to
break and enter a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor, an
offense punishable by imprisonment "not exceeding five years." '' Florida
Statutes section 776.04 provides that the penalty shall be five years if the
offense attempted is punishable, were it actually accomplished, by im-
prisonment for five years or more, but only one year if the offense at-
tempted is punishable by imprisonment for "less than five years." The
supreme court reversed the decision of the appellate court and held that
the five-year penalty was applicable. 0 2
Credit for time served prior to and during trial is a matter of discre-
tion 20 3 because a sentence does not begin to run, within the meaning of
Florida Statutes section 921.161(1), until the time of actual incarcera-
tion.20 4 On the other hand, when a defendant serves time under a void
judgment and sentence, credits for time served plus gain time is a matter
197. 206 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
198. Watson v. State, 200 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
199. Thomas v. State, 220 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
200. 202 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1967).
201. FLA. STAT. § 810.05 (1967).
202. State v. Fitz, 202 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1967), rev'g Fitz v. State, 196 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1967). The holding of the court thus posits an equivalence between the phrases "five
years or more" and "not exceeding five years."
203. Presha v. State, 216 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
204. Miles v. State, 214 So.2d 101 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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of right at the resentencing.0° Time passed on parole, however, is not
credited toward sentencing when parole is revoked." 6
When a defendant is sentenced and put on probation, he may be sen-
tenced to a longer term than the original sentence after a violation of
probation.
2 0 7
Enhanced punishment meted out to a second offender under Florida
Statutes section 775.09 must be predicated upon a prior valid conviction
and thus should be revoked after the first conviction is reversed for a
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.208
Florida Statutes section 921.16 provides that when a defendant has
been convicted of two or more offenses charged in the same indictment or
information or in a consolidated indictment or information, the sentences
shall run concurrently unless the sentencing judge expressly directs that
they be served consecutively. Thus, in Wicker v. McCall,s 9 where the
defendant plead guilty to seventeen separate charges and was sentenced
to three months on each, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
granted after three months on the grounds that the sentences were con-
current. But where the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms, the
defendant's claim that the sentences for two crimes which, although dis-
tinct, were committed in the course of one criminal transaction and
charged in one information must run concurrently was rejected.
210
In Martino v. State,2 ' it was held that it is not error for the judge to
refuse to disclose the contents of the confidential presentencing report on
the defendant.
In capital cases the jury has the power to recommend mercy.212 In
considering such a recommendation, however, the jury should not concern
itself with the possibility of parole of the defendant if not sentenced to
death.218
XI. METROPOLITAN COURT
There is no right to a trial by jury in a municipal court on the charge
of driving while intoxicated, which carries a maximum penalty of sixty
days in jail and/or a 500 dollar fine.
2 14
205. Milligan v. State, 207 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
206. Porter v. State, 212 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
207. Ruiter v. State, 205 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
208. Lee v. State, 217 So.2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
209. 203 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
210. Footman v. State, 203 So.2d 356 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
211. 215 So.2d 495 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
212. FLA. STAT. § 919.23(2) (1967) provides: "Whoever is convicted of a capital offense
and recommended to the mercy of the court by a majority of the jury in their verdict, shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for life."
213. See, e.g., Van Eaton v. State, 205 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1967).
214. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1968), citing Cheff v. Schnacken-
berg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See note 321 and accompanying text infra.
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XII. FORMER JEOPARDY
Where the trial judge, in order to protect the defendant's right to
have a fair trial, exercises his discretion upon good cause to declare a
mistrial on his own motion, a plea of former jeopardy will not be sustained
as a defense to a subsequent prosecution on the same indictment.2 15 The
defense of former jeopardy is sustained, however, when the trial judge,
without the consent of the defendant, declares a mistrial for legally in-
sufficient reasons;2 16 such discharge is considered to be tantamount to a
judgment of acquittal.217
Double jeopardy is not a bar to separate trials for the same conduct
by different governmental entities when a municipal ordinance and a state
statute both prohibit the conduct of the defendant.18
It is not double jeopardy for the defendant to be subjected to two
trials for two deaths arising out of the same automobile accident.21"
Neither is it double jeopardy for the defendant to be tried for assault with
intent to commit murder of the mother after having been convicted of
manslaughter of the fetus; even though both charges arose out of the
same "transaction," the offenses are different and require different proofs,
particularly as to the element of intent.
220
In Reyes v. Kelly, 221 the defendant was arrested for first-degree
murder and subsequently agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder.
At trial, the court refused to accept the plea because of the possibility that
the defendant had been acting in self-defense. The state then obtained an
indictment for first-degree murder and the defendant moved to quash on
the grounds that his prior plea of guilty put him in double jeopardy. The
district court rejected the argument because his plea of guilty had not
been accepted by the judge and was therefore not effective. Accordingly,
the prior plea did not constitute former jeopardy.
XIII. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
In noncapital cases, a defendant may waive his right to be present,
and voluntary absence from court constitutes a waiver.222
Rule 1.850 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]
court may entertain and determine such motion [a collateral attack upon
215. Adkins v. Smith, 205 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1968).
216. Bryant v. Stickley, 215 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; State v. Smith, 209 So.2d
876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) ; State v. Lanier, 205 So.2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
217. State v. Lane, 209 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); State v. Lanier, 205 So.2d 671
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
218. Hilliard v. City of Gainesville, 213 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1968); Waller v. State, 213
So.2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
219. Hanemann v. State, 221 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
220. State v. Shaw, 219 So.2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
221. 204 So.2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
222. Henzel v. State, 21 So.2d 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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the conviction] without requiring production of the prisoner at the hear-
ing." Accordingly, in Bryant v. State,223 the court held that although the
better procedure is to have the movant present when there are questions
of fact to be resolved, such presence is a matter of discretion.
XIV. PRELIMINARY HEARING
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there
is probable cause to hold an accused for trial. Despite the mandatory
language of Florida Statutes section 901.23 that "[a]n officer who has
arrested a person without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take
the person arrested before the nearest or most accessible magistrate... "
the courts continue to adhere to the position that a preliminary hearing is
not a necessary step in a criminal prosecution.224
XV. FAIR TRIAL
It was error for the prosecution to ask the defendant if he had
bragged to a barmaid that he was going to steal a safe when the state had
no such statement from the barmaid, and the error was not cured by an
instruction from the judge that the jury should disregard the question.225
The defendant was not denied a fair trial when no timely objection
was made to the prosecution's eliciting on cross-examination that an ac-
complice had plead guilty.220 On the other hand, the defendant was denied
a fair trial where the prosecutor in closing argument commented on the
defendant's testimony about a previous conviction by saying that "[1] ess
than forty-four days after he got out of prison, he is back robbing." '27 It
was also error for the prosecutor to tell the jury that, if convicted, the
defendant could still be put on probation, but the error was cured by an
instruction from the judge.2 8
Where an identification witness other than a member of the de-
ceased's family was available, the use of a relative was prejudicial error.229
No reversible error was committed where the defendant was forced
to stand trial in jail clothes and the trial judge instructed the jury that the
clothes should not be considered evidence of guilt.30 On the other hand, it
223. 204 So.2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
224. See, e.g., Di Bona v. State, 121 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
225. Marsh v. State, 202 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
226. Walters v. State, 217 So.2d 615 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). But cf. Thomas v. State, 202
So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), where in the presence of the jury the prosecution stated that
the defendant's accomplice had been convicted. The judge denied a motion for a mistrial, but
did not give the jury instructions to disregard the remark. On appeal, the conviction was
reversed.
227. Davis v. State, 214 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
228. Zide v. State, 212 So.2d 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
229. Ashmore v. State, 214 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
230. Atkins v. State, 210 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). The practice is strongly con-
demned, however, by Shultz v. State, 131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (1938), although in the
instant case Shultz's disapproval was considered to be dictum.
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was prejudicial error for the judge to refer to "the scene of the crime,"
even though he later instructed the jury that the correct phrase was
"scene of the alleged crime."' 31
The defendant was denied a fair trial where the judge was not present
during the whole time that the jury was viewing the scene.282
An interesting decision was rendered in O'Brien v. State,233 which, in
apparent conflict with the usual rule that only the State's knowing use of
perjured testimony requires reversal, held that a new trial should be
granted when there is serious doubt as to the truth of the testimony of a
key witness for the state.
When the judge threatened the defense counsel with contempt for his
obstreperous conduct in questioning witnesses, the court held that al-
though such rebuke should have been made outside the presence of the
jury, it was not so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial.23 4
The defendant was denied a fair trial where, among other errors, a
juror gave false answers on voir dire and a material witness for the state,
a sheriff, had charge of the jury.2 5
The defendant was not denied a fair trial, although the judge, in a
nonjury trial, adjudicated him guilty before defense counsel made his
closing argument, as after objection thereto the judge offered to vacate
judgment and hear closing argument but the attorney declined. 6
Where the three offenses charged in the same information arose from
related circumstances and would require similar proof, the defendant was
not entitled to six peremptory challenges, under Florida Statutes section
918.08 (2), for each offense.
287
In Bell v. State,"8 the trial court denied the indigent defendant's
motion to have the court reporter transcribe the closing arguments of the
prosecution, and the defendant claimed that this was a denial of due pro-
cess and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. On appeal,
the court ruled that although an indigent's motion to record closing argu-
ments should be granted, conviction should not be reversed unless the
defendant can demonstrate, by having objections and the judge's rulings
thereon made part of the record, that the prosecution made prejudicial
remarks in his closing argument.
231. Beckham v. State, 209 So.2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). The appellate court also
concluded that prejudicial error was committed by the judge in giving the instruction on
manslaughter because it confused the jury.
232. Dodd v. State, 209 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1968).
233. 206 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
234. Baisden v. State, 203 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
235. Langston v. State, 212 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
236. Rissler v. State, 212 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
237. Costantino v. State, 203 So.2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); cf. Johnson v. State, 206
So.2d 673 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). In Johnson, however, there were two separate informations
for passing two different checks on different days, and the charges were merely consolidated
for trial.
238. 208 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968), followed by Thomas v. State, 214 So.2d 890
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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Separate trials should be held where the interests of the codefendants
are in conflict, but a motion for severance need not be granted where
there is no showing that the testimony of one or his failure to testify
would implicate the other." 9
XVI. GRAND JURY
In Dawkins v. State, 4' the defendant was held in contempt, notwith-
standing the first amendment, for attempting to influence the grand jury
in its deliberations by distributing circulars in close proximity to the
grand jury room.
Unauthorized presence at a grand jury deliberation is a violation of
Florida Statutes section 905.17, but it does not require a ruling of con-
tempt since the matter is one of discretion.24'
In Martin v. State,242 the defendant was subpoenaed to appear be-
fore the grand jury and was granted immunity under Florida Statutes
section 932.29, but he refused to answer any questions. The court held
that if a witness has a bona fide fear of self-incrimination despite the
grant of immunity, he should specifically state his objection and let the
court rule on it; where, however, the witness has no intention of answering
any questions, he may properly be held in contempt.
In State v. Demetree,245 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed an
order of the trial judge which quashed the indictment on the grounds that
the grand jury had not been selected in conformity with the provisions
of Florida Laws 1957, Chapter 57-550. The court ruled that the proce-
dure whereby each commissioner selected people whom be considered
qualified under the law and who were then reviewed by the full commis-
sion was sufficient compliance. 244
XVII. HABEAS CORPUS
In Powe v. State,245 the Supreme Court of Florida held that habeas
corpus, rather than a motion under rule 1.850, is the appropriate remedy
for the failure of the trial court to appoint an attorney to take an appeal
for an indigent. The Florida Supreme Court has also held that where
239. Sosa v. State, 215 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1968).
240. 208 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
241. Harper v. State, 217 So.2d 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
242. 208 So.2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). The court also stated that a witness has no
right to confer with an attorney in the hall outside the grand jury room.
243. 213 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1968). The supreme court also rejected the trial judge's con-
clusion that the method of grand jury selection was not calculated to produce a fair cross-
section of the community as required by the fourteenth amendment because there was no
attempt to exclude any segment of the community from the grand jury list.
244. See also Shifrin v. State, 210 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), which held that
Florida Laws 1957, ch. 57-550 authorized, but did not require, the grand jury commission
to make investigations to determine the fitness of grand jurors. Since investigation was dis-
cretionary, there was no abuse of discretion where there was no showing that any juror was
not qualified.
245. 216 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1968). See note 8 supra.
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direct appeal was no longer available because the petitioner had not re-
ceived timely notice that his court-appointed attorney had been per-
mitted to withdraw, full appellate review could be had by way of habeas
corpus.240
Rule 1.850 provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus
shall not be entertained in behalf of a prisoner who has failed to apply
for relief by motion under the rule. In Ward v. State, 47 this provision was
apparently extended to require the discharge of a writ of habeas corpus
where the prisoner had filed a motion under the rule but had failed to
appeal the adverse decision. Nor is relief by way of habeas corpus avail-
able to test the legality of an arrest where the petitioner fails to take a
direct appeal from his conviction.248
XVIII. IMMUNITY
A promise of immunity from prosecution for homicide given by the
prosecuting attorney in order to force the defendant to testify is not
within the immunity statute2 49 because murder is not one of the crimes
listed therein. Thus, it is merely a contractual immunity, and there is a
conflict of authority as to whether the court must approve such a promise
in order for it to be effective. 50
The immunity statute applies even when the defendant is charged
with a crime before testifying at the grand jury hearing; otherwise, such
testimony would be an unconstitutional, compelled self-incrimination.25'
When a public employee is required by law to testify before a grand
jury or lose his employment, his subsequent dismissal on the basis of
facts about which he testified under subpoena is a prohibited "penalty"
within the meaning of Florida Statutes section 932.29.252 The employee's
waiver of immunity is, in effect, compelled and therefore involuntary
246. Williams v. Wainwright, 217 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1969).
247. 202 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1967).
248. Ferenc v. Thursby, 212 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
249. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1967) provides:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or producing any
book, paper or other document before any court upon any investigation, proceeding
or trial, for a violation of any of the statutes of this state against bribery, burglary,
larceny, gaming or gambling, or of any of the statutes against the illegal sale of
spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, upon the ground or for the reason that the
testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to
convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall
be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding.
250. State v. Grech, 219 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). The case was decided on other
grounds, i.e., that immunity was granted for homicide and not breaking and entering, and
that no testimony was given at the grand jury hearing that could be considered a link in
the chain of evidence.
251. State v. O'Toole, 203 So.2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967), approving the view of State
ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
252. Headley v. Baron, 211 So.2d 223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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since the alternative to a refusal is loss of employment.25 This forced
choice between loss of livelihood and self-incrimination is a violation of
the fifth amendment. 54
XIX. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
A prosecution upon information without a prior determination of
probable cause at a preliminary hearing and without an indictment by
the grand jury is not a deprivation of due process of law.255 On the other
hand, it is unlawful to convict a defendant charged with bribery of ob-
structing an officer in the performance of his duties; the latter is not
necessarily a lesser-included offense of the former.256
When a state attorney files an information based upon a grand-jury
indictment, he may not expand or enlarge upon the indictment without
resubmission to the grand jury unless he abandons the indictment as
the basis of the information and files an information under oath as re-
quired by Florida Statutes section 923.03 (2).257 Thus, the state attorney,
when filing an information based upon an indictment pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 32.18, may not supply essential allegations that were
omitted from the indictment but must instead obtain a new one or file
an information pursuant to Florida Statutes section 923.03 (2).2' These
are the only two methods by which a state attorney can file an informa-
tion .
2 5 1
An information based on Florida Statutes section 847.04, forbidding
the use of profane language in public, is void if it fails to specify the
words constituting the alleged profanity.26° Similarly, the granting of a
motion to quash for vagueness was affirmed when the charge alleged that
the defendant committed a conspiracy between April 1, 1965, and Febru-
ary 24, 1967.261
XX. EVIDENCE
In Williams v. State,262 the Supreme Court of Florida laid down the
rule that evidence of previous crimes is admissible, if relevant, to prove
253. State v. Dayton, 215 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); State v. Buchanan, 207 So.2d
711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
254. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), cited by State v. Dayton, 215 So.2d
87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Headley v. Baron, 211 So.2d 223 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); State v.
Buchanan, 207 So.2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). Compare Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967), wherein the Supreme Court reversed the disbarment of an attorney who refused to
obey a subpoena duces tecum and refused to testify at the judicial inquiry on the ground
that to do so would tend to incriminate him.
255. State v. Hernandez, 217 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1968).
256. Mangone v. State, 219 So.2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
257. State v. Hill, 208 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Warren v. State, 213 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
261. State v. Dayton, 215 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
262. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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the case on trial by the establishment of a common scheme, identity,
motive, intent, or absence of mistake. In Winkfield v. State,63 the
Williams rule was interpreted to mean that "evidence of other offenses is
admissible if:
[1] it is relevant and has probative value in proof of the instant
case or some material fact or facts in issue ... ; and
[2] its sole purpose is not to show the bad character of the ac-
cused; and
[3] its sole purpose is not to show the propensity of the accused
to commit the instant crime charged; and
[4] its admission is not precluded by some other specific excep-
tion or rule of exclusion.264
This rule received a questionable application in a case where the de-
fendant was acquitted of the previous alleged crime.265
The Williams rule was further modified by a subtle distinction be-
tween "prior intemperate habits" and "character." The Florida Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of evidence of the defendant's alcoholism,
not as direct evidence of his intoxication at the time of the accident, but
as evidence of his prior intemperate habits which tended to corroborate
the direct evidence of his intoxication.266
It has also been held proper for the prosecution to bring out on
cross-examination that a defense witness was with the defendant during
the event in question and is also under prosecution because it bears upon
the credibility of his testimony.
267
Decisions on hearsay evidence include holdings that the improper
admission of hearsay which is merely cumulative of other competent
evidence is not reversible error; 268 that a witness may testify as to extra-
judicial statements made to him for the purpose of corroborating other
direct testimony;2 69 that the declaration of a co-conspirator is not ad-
missible against the other conspirators where there is insufficient inde-
pendent proof of the conspiracy; 270 and that a defendant waives his
objection to hearsay evidence when his attorney on cross-examination
asks the witness the question that brings it in.
271
263. 209 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
264. Id. at 471, quoting Green v. State, 190 So.2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966). Note that
the evidence of another crime introduced was of a subsequent and different charge for which
the defendant was not yet tried, whereas the decision in the Williams case sustained the ad-
mission of evidence of a previous crime.
265. Blackburn v. State, 208 So.2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
266. Wadsworth v. State, 210 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1968). The case was heard upon conflict
certiorari, and the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the view of Locke v. Brown, 194
So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
267. Herzig v. State, 213 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
268. Culberson v. State, 210 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
269. Willis v. State, 208 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
270. Farnell v. State, 214 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
271. Cox v. State, 219 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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Decisions on pictorial evidence include holdings that it is not error
to introduce "mug shot" photographs for purposes of identification;272
that motion pictures taken by police of the capture and arrest of the
defendant are admissible;273 that gruesome pictures are not admissible
unless particularly relevant; 274 and that pictures are not admissible if
offered for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant.7 5
Two recent cases have held that when a witness has refreshed his
present recollection by the use of notes or memoranda outside the court-
room, he is not obliged, unless the court in its discretion orders otherwise,
to produce them at trial for the defense's inspection. 70 Also, on the issue
of inspection, Manon v. State277 stated the rule that a defendant is not
entitled to inspect a transcript of statements of the state's witnesses
taken by the prosecution in the course of preparation for trial unless they
are taken before a magistrate or used by the prosecution at trial.7
A blood test taken as part of an investigation of an automobile
accident under Florida Statutes section 317.171271 is inadmissible in a
subsequent prosecution for manslaughter.280 This is so notwithstanding
that, prior to the test, the officer advised the motorist of his right to
counsel and that the results of the blood-alcohol test could be used
against him in the event manslaughter charges were filed.28' On similar
facts, however, the same district court of appeal construed the blood-
alcohol test to be part of an investigation for crime, not an investigation
under Florida Statutes section 317.171, and therefore admissible.282
Where the defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated, evi-
dence of his refusal to take the optional breath-analysis test is inad-
missible because it would impinge upon the fifth-amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; if the test were taken, however, its results
would be admissible. 3 If, on the other hand, the defendant is given no
option to refuse because the test is compulsory, evidence of the defend-
272. White v. State, 218 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
273. Kimbrough v. State, 219 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
274. Dillen v. State, 202 So.2d 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). The pictures were necessary to
prove that death was caused by blows to the body.
275. Alburton v. State, 221 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
276. Kimbrough v. State, 219 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) ; Williams v. State, 208
So.2d 628 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
277. 220 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
278. To the same effect is Colebrook v. State, 205 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). Both
Manon and Colebrook rely on Jackman v. State, 140 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
279. "All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without
prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the depart-
ment .... No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out
of an accident . .. ."
280. State v. Thomas, 212 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
281. Coffey v. State, 205 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
282. Timmons v. State, 214 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
283. Gay v. City of Orlando, 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967), citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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ant's resistance -is admissible because it is relevant to an inference of
guilt.
28 4
In Cirack v. State,285 the court held that it was error for the trial
court to permit a psychiatrist to testify that the defendant's judgment of
right and wrong had been impaired by intoxication when the only evi-
dence of drinking was the defendant's statement to the psychiatrist. An
expert may testify as to matters not put into evidence only if such matters
are not the major basis for his opinion of the defendant's sanity.
On the subject of privileged communications between husband and
wife, Gates v. State28 held that a wife could testify as to her husband's
prior acts of violence against a child because such acts were not com-
munications and could not therefore be privileged. The same rationale is
followed by Ross v. State,287 where the defendant was charged with
breaking into an automobile, and his wife was permitted to testify that
the defendant gave her a sweater alleged to have been stolen from the
car.
The rule that fingerprints found in a place open to the public are
not admissible unless circumstances are such that the prints could only
have been made at the time the crime was committed was interpreted to
be limited to cases where there is no other evidence of the identity of the
perpetrator. 88
In a case where several witnesses testified that they saw a man run-
ning away from the scene of a crime with a limp, the defendant wanted
to demonstrate, without being subject to cross-examination, that he ran
without a limp. The court ruled that running would be a form of testi-
mony and that the defendant would have to take the stand for cross-
examination if he wanted to make the demonstration. 89
In Koran v. State,29 the evidence admitted included tapes made by
284. State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). A chemical test for traces of
gun powder was forcibly administered to the defendant, and both the results of the test and
his conduct in resisting it were introduced into evidence at trial. In reaching the latter
result, the case of Gay v. City of Orlando, 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967) was correctly
distinguished as involving a noncompulsory test. Nevertheless, the soundness of the Esperti
decision is open to question.
It is true that the results of a physical test are admissible under Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), which held that the administration of a blood-alcohol test to a de-
fendant over his objection was not violative of the privilege against self-incrimination be-
cause no testimonial compulsion was involved. Evidence of a refusal to cooperate in the ad-
ministration of such a test, however, is probably not admissible. Although Schmerber did
not rule directly on this question, there is a dictum contained in a footnote that "the State
may have to forgo the advantage of any testimonial products of administering the test-
products which would fall within the privilege." Id. at 765 n.9 (emphasis in the original).
See generally Comment, Admissibility of Testimonial By-Products oj a Physical Test, 24
U. MAvmi L. REv. 50 (1969).
285. 201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967).
286. 201 So.2d 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
287. 202 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
288. Dixon v. State, 216 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
289. Machin v. State, 213 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
290. 213 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
an undercover agent who was wired with a concealed -radio transmitter
and recorded telephone conversations obtained with the consent of the
agent. The defendant claimed that the use of such recordings violated
his fourth-amendment rights, but the court held that evidence obtained
by a recording device hidden on the person of an informant is admissible
under Lopez v. United States291 and that the phone conversations were
admissible because one of the parties consented.292
In Cooper v. City of Fort Lauderdale,29' an ordinance prohibited the
destruction of property listed in a search warrant. The destruction of such
property is deemed prima facie evidence that it was the object of the
search. When presented with a warrant for bolita tickets, the defendant
crumpled and swallowed a small piece of paper. He was convicted of a
violation of the ordinance, and asserted on appeal that the ordinance
violates the holding of Jefferson v. Sweat 2 ' that one presumption cannot
serve as the basis for a second. The court rejected this contention, hold-
ing that there was prima facie evidence that a crime was committed be-
cause of the circulation of bolita tickets within the city.
295
Ramey v. State296 held that it is not an abuse of discretion for the
trial judge to permit an eight-year-old girl to testify. Similarly, Hoskins
v. State2 7 held it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to summon a
witness for the defense where the expense is great and the witness would
not state in advance the nature of his testimony.
In Wilson v. State,98 on the other hand, it was held to be an abuse
of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to permit the defense to call a
witness whose name was not furnished in advance because of the neglect
of state-appointed defense counsel to supply the prosecution with a list
of witnesses after having made a motion for reciprocal discovery pursuant
to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 1.220(e). Reversal was limited,
however, to the conviction on the one count of the information to which
the witness' testimony would have been relevant.
291. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
292. The fact of consent distinguished the case from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), where a public phone had been "bugged" without the consent of any of the
parties to the conversations. The court noted, however, that Katz was decided after the
defendant's trial, and had not been held retroactive, nor binding on the states. In any event,
the Lopez rationale applies with equal force to the phone conversations; since the agent was
a party to them, he was able to testify as to their contents from his own personal knowledge.
The recording serves merely to corroborate his testimony.
293. 203 So.2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
294. 76 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1954).
295. The fallacy of this reasoning is, of course, that there is no prima fade evidence of
a crime committed by the defendant. It must be remembered that the defendant was charged
with destruction, not posseision, of bolita tickets. The presumption is thus self-justifying.
296. 202 So.2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
297. 221 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
298. 220 So.2d 426 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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XXI. PLEA OF GUILTY
It is not error to deny a motion to withdraw a negotiated plea of
guilty obtained by the state without fraud or deceit, although the de-
fendant was neither represented by counsel nor informed of the maximum
possible sentence for the offense.299 It is error, however, to deny the
defendant's motion for a change of plea to not guilty, although he had
already been convicted and sentenced, where an affidavit was submitted
to the court that the defendant's accuser had lied. 00 Similarly, the denial
of a motion to vacate the adjudication of guilt and the plea of nolo con-
tendere (which had been changed from a plea of not guilty) was held to
be an abuse of discretion where the ends of justice would be served by
permitting the defendant, a former psychiatric patient, to substitute a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.'
Where the defendant alleges that his plea of guilty was coerced by
the police, and the allegation is not rebutted by the state, he is entitled
to a hearing on his motion under rule 1.850, although he was represented
by counsel at all times."' Similarly, where the defendant alleges that he
had been induced to enter a plea of guilty by false representations of the
public defender that a deal for probation had been arranged with the
prosecutor, a hearing under rule 1.850 should be held. °3 The court further
stated that a plea of guilty must be entirely voluntary and not unduly
motivated by misapprehension or coercion.304
A judgment upon a voluntary plea of guilty, given with the advise
of counsel, is not rendered invalid merely because the defendant had
previously confessed under circumstances-without presence of counsel
-which might have rendered the confession inadmissible. 05
Where the defendant's efforts to consult with the public defender
assigned to his case were frustrated because the latter was too busy, the
defendant's plea of guilty at his arraignment was given without the
effective assistance of counsel, and his conviction was therefore subject to
attack under rule 1.850.306 This applies a fortiori to the case where the
299. Aranda v. State, 205 So.2d 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
300. Riddle v. State, 212 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
301. Peterson v. State, 206 So.2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
302. Bennett v. State, 203 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
303. Bartz v. State, 221 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
304. Id., citing Reddick v. State, 190 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966). But see Manning
v. State, 203 So.2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967), wherein the same court affirmed the denial of
a motion under rule 1.850 although the defendant alleged that his plea of guilty had been
induced by a promise of a lighter sentence.
305. Hield v. State, 201 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967). See also Ford v. State, 210
So.2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) and Camacho v. State, 203 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967),
holding that a plea of guilty with the advice of counsel is not rendered involuntary by the
fact that the defendant had previously confessed.
306. Bush v. State, 209 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
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accused was neither represented by counsel nor informed of his right
thereto.3
0 7
A plea of guilty waives the right to trial by jury"°8 and may be en-
tered even in a capital case.309
XXII. NOLO CONTENDERE
The rule of Smith v. State310 that a plea of nolo contendere is not
acceptable in a capital case was held inapplicable where no death sentence
was involved as a consequence of an agreement with the state, approved
by the court, that a life sentence would be imposed."'
XXIII. SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Young v. State,"1 ' the defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering with the intent to commit a felony. At the trial, the judge had
instructed the jury that the defendant's failure to explain his possession
of stolen goods upon his arrest raised an inference of guilt. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that this instruction violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The appellate court agreed, and re-
versed the conviction upon the authority of Miranda v. Arizona:" '
[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his
Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial
the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face
of accusation. 1 4
This decision of the fourth district encountered a hostile reception
in the first district in Shaw v. State. 5 The court drew a dubious distinc-
tion between apprehension by the police and interrogation, stating that the
accused has "ample opportunity" during the hiatus between apprehension
and questioning in which to explain his possession of stolen goods.
The controversy was brought to a close by the Florida Supreme
Court, which reviewed Young on conflict certiorari and reversed. 16 The
court's two-fold rationale was that (1) Miranda is inapplicable because
it was decided in the context of the admissibility of statements procured
by custodial interrogation and no statements were elicited from Young;
307. Ray v. State, 200 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1967).
308. Thomas v. State, 201 So.2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
309. Miller v. State, 217 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
310. 197 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1967).
311. Peel v. State, 210 So.2d 14 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
312. 203 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967), followed by Carpenter v. State, 213 So.2d
738 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
313. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
314. Id. at 468, n.37, quoted by Young v. State, 203 So.2d at 651.
315. 209 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
316. State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968), followed by Burroughs v. State, 221
So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). See Note 24 U. MT.Am L. REV. 200 (1969).
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and (2) the Florida rule neither requires the accused to speak nor
penalizes him for his failure to do so by creating a presumption of law;
it is merely a rule of circumstantial evidence which authorizes a per-
missible, not a mandatory, inference of guilt.
Justice Thornal, joined by Justices Drew and Ervin, dissented on
the grounds that "[a] duty to explain is simply inconsistent with a right
to remain silent. '3 17 Although Thornal concluded that the instruction
was erroneous under Miranda, he cleverly devised a method of reconcilia-
tion between the two: the simple expedient of eliminating the word "un-
explained" from the instruction. Thus, "any possession of recently stolen
property would support an inference of guilt."31
Another Miranda-engendered conflict with a Florida rule of evidence
arose in Jones v. State,31 9 which overruled the prior law that permitted the
state to introduce evidence that the defendant remained silent in the face
of an accusation of crime. The court held that Miranda renders evidence
of such silence inadmissible as a penalty upon invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination.120 In addition, the court held that the admis-
sion of such evidence, even in the absence of objection by the defendant,
is fundamental error which requires reversal.
XXIV. JURY TRIAL
A. Right to Trial by Jury
There is no right to a trial by jury in a municipal court on the charge
of driving while intoxicated where the maximum penalty is sixty days
in jail and/or a $500 fine.82'
The right to trial by jury may be waived, even in a capital case, and
the waiver is effected by a plea of guilty. 2 2 If the plea of guilty is volun-
tary, the court need not advise the defendant that he thereby waives his
right to a jury trial.
3 23
Trial by jury can, of course, also be waived without a plea of guilty,
317. State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1968).
318. Id. This idea was also advanced in Carpenter v. State, 213 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1968).
319. 200 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
320. Id. But see Reilly v. State, 212 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968), where the court,
distinguishing Jones, admitted evidence of the defendant's failure to explain his unauthorized
presence in another's apartment on the theory that such explanation would not be a denial of
guilt.
321. Hilliard v. City of Gainsville, 213 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1968), citing Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), which defined a petty offense not requiring a jury trial
as one not punishable by more than six months in prison and a $500 fine.
322. Miller v. State, 217 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). An interesting point implicit in
the case, but not discussed by the court, is whether a trial judge has the power to impose a
life sentence for a capital offense without a recommendation of mercy by a jury as provided
by FLA. STAT. § 919.23(2) (1967). See note 212 supra.
323. Thomas v. State, 201 So.2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). The case fails to meet the
issue of how a defendant can effect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right if he is
not first informed of it.
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but the waiver can be withdrawn if it is not voluntary. Thus, where
the trial judge would grant the defendant's request for another continu-
ance only on the condition that he waive trial by jury, the waiver was
set aside.324 In other circumstances, however, the granting of a request
to withdraw the waiver is a matter of discretion resting with the trial
judge; and it is not an abuse of discretion to deny such a request where




The United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois3 20 held
that it is a denial of due process of law and of the right to a trial by an
impartial jury to exclude for cause prospective jurors whose objections to
capital punishment fall short of unequivocal opposition. 27 However, the
exclusion of such qualified jurors is not reversible error when the de-
fendant is not actually sentenced to death.328
It is not error to allow jurors to separate during the period between
instruction by the court and the retiring of the jury when the jury is not
confined during the trial.829
When on voir dire prospective jurors are excused because they admit
prejudice against the defendant, it is not necessary to discharge the entire
panel if the judge instructs the panel to disregard the statements of those
excused.
3 80
When there was no concealment or fraud, it was not error for the
judge to refuse to grant a mistrial because a juror became aware during
trial that he was a first cousin of a state witness. 81
XXV. SPEEDY TRIAL
In State v. Sokol, 3 2 the state took a nolle prosequi just before the
jury was to be sworn in. When a new information was filed, the defendant
moved to quash on the grounds that the state's conduct deprived him of
the right to a speedy trial. The appellate court reversed the granting of
the motion, holding that the state may take a nolle prosequi any time
before the jury is sworn.
3 33
The right to a speedy trial extends to permit a prisoner of another
324. Berry v. State, 203 So.2d 336 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
325. Pearson v. State, 213 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Rice v. State, 211 So.2d 39
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
326. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
327. See Note, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 631 (1969).
328. Thomas v. State, 220 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), following Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
329. Simmons v. State, 214 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
330. Stone v. State, 208 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
331. Hartley v. State, 214 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
332. 208 So.2d 156 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
333. Id.
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sovereign (the United States Government) to require the proper Florida
officials to initiate proceedings for his return to stand trial on charges
which form the basis of a detainer warrant. 34 Conversely, one imprisoned
in Florida who is charged with a crime in Kansas should seek to vindicate
his right to a speedy trial in the courts of Kansas, not in those of
Florida. 3 5
A delay caused by the defendant's request for a change of venue does
not entitle him to discharge because the state has not denied him a speedy
trial."" Similarly, a defendant is not denied a speedy trial where his
motion for a new trial is granted.
33 7
An appeal by the state from an order granting a new trial operates
to stay that order until the disposition of the appeal, and the required
three terms of court under Florida Statutes section 915.01 do not begin
to run until the order becomes final. Hence, the defendant in State v.
Cook 38 was not entitled to an acquittal.
XXVI. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND DEFENSES
A. Crimes
A conviction of aggravated assault was reversed in Rogan v. State30
on the grounds that a flower pot, in the circumstances under which it
was thrown, was not a deadly weapon. Similarly, the conviction of ag-
gravated assault was reversed in Forchion v. State, 4° the court holding
that a broom handle thrown (accurately) by the defendant was not a
deadly weapon. The court stated that the test for a deadly weapon is not
whether it is capable of causing death, but whether its use is likely to
cause death.
To sustain a conviction for aggravated assault, it is not necessary for
the state to prove an actual attempt to carry out the assault with a deadly
weapon but only a bare assault upon another with such weapon.841
The corpus delicti, i.e., evidence that a crime has been committed by
someone, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For homicide, proof
of the corpus delicti requires proof of death, criminal agency as a cause
of death, and the identity of the deceased. Thus, where the body of the
victim was identified only after being shot but while still alive, there
was no proof of the identity of the deceased; and the conviction had to
be reversed. 42
334. Dickey v. Circuit Court, 200 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1967). The rule of this case is not
retroactive. Hoskins v. State, 221 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
335. Floyd v. State, 221 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
336. State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 219 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
337. State v. Harper, 213 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
338. 201 So.2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
339. 203 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
340. 214 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
341. Albright v. State, 214 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
342. Johnson v. State, 201 So.2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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Proof of the corpus delicti of attempted larceny does not require
proof that links the defendant with the crime, but only that a crime was
committed by someone. In order to convict, of course, the defendant
must be linked with the crime; and this was accomplished in Pickett v.
State843 by introduction into evidence of the defendant's voluntary con-
fession. The corpus delicti, in other words, is an element of the crime and
not the identity of the perpetrator.
Further delineation in the law of gambling occurred in Schell v.
State,344 which held that bookmaking is not a lesser-included offense of
keeping a gambling house. On the contrary, the two are separate and dis-
tinct statutory crimes. 45
There were also several developments in the law of larceny. Mc-
Daniel v. State 46 held that value is an essential element of grand larceny
and therefore must be proved at trial, but it is not an essential element
of petit larceny. To determine the value of a stolen article for the purpose
of proving grand larceny, the value of the article at the time it was taken,
rather than the new purchase price, is controlling. This rule was re-
affirmed in Spencer v. State,47 where the court reversed the conviction of
grand larceny with directions to enter a judgment of conviction for petit
larceny.
The quantum of proof of value was at issue in Miller v. State.343 The
only evidence as to value was the estimate of the owner as to what was
missing and, as in Spencer, the court reversed the conviction of grand
larceny and entered judgment for the lesser-included offense.
Proof of value also bears on criminal intent. Thus, in Gamble v.
State,"4" the court held that a charge of breaking and entering with the
intent to commit grand larceny requires proof of an intent to steal goods
the value of which is in excess of $100 at the time of the breaking and
entering.
In Burroughs v. State, 5' the defendant's contention that the pre-
sumption of guilt from the possession of recently stolen goods will not
support a conviction of larceny was rejected. His contention that posses-
sion four to six weeks after the theft is not "recent" was also rejected.
In a case where the charge was possession of narcotics, it was held
that knowledge of the presence of narcotics may be inferred when the
defendant has exclusive control of the premises; but when the defendant
lacks exclusive control, actual knowledge must be proved. The conviction
was accordingly reversed."'
343. 202 So.2d 203 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
344. 211 So.2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
345. Keeping a gambling house is prohibited by FLA. STAT. § 849.01 (1967); bookmaking
is prohibited by FLA. STAT. § 849.25(2) (1967).
346. 221 So.2d 758 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
347. 217 So.2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
348. 212 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
349. 210 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
350. 221 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
351. Markman v. State, 210 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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In Felton v. City of Pensacola, 52 an officer seized "nudie" maga-
zines from a newstand. His probable cause to believe that the magazines
were obscene was based purely on subjective judgment, as indicated
by his testimony at trial where he said, "I used no test, sir; I just used
my own good judgment that nude men and women in a magazine together
would be a violation of law.1 a11 The court stated that the "procedure used
in the present case, in which the police officer merely used 'his own good
judgment' in determining whether the publications were obscene, clearly
controverted the guarantee of freedom of speech and the press in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the guarantee of
due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 'a 5a The court further
found, however, that the appellants had waived their right to object
to the illegal procedure by announcing at trial that they had no objec-
tion to the admission of the magazines into evidence. Felton reached the
United States Supreme Court, which rendered a per curiam reversal" 5
on the authority of Redrup v. New York.35 6
Another Florida case with constitutional ramifications is Johnson v.
State."'7 The defendant was convicted of vagrancy for sitting on a bus
bench at a very late hour with little money in his pocket. The consti-
tutionality of the vagrancy statute was not discussed by the United States
Supreme Court, which based its reversal solely on the ground that the
State had not proven any violation of the statute and that it is a violation
of due process of law to convict without evidence of guilt.8"8
In Bradley v. State,'5" an indictment for perjury was dismissed be-
cause it omitted an essential element of the crime-the allegation that
the defendant was under oath.
In State v. Wolfe," '° the defendant argued that he could not be
convicted of perjury committed in the course of a previous trial which
resulted in a reversal of the conviction because of a due process violation.
The court disagreed, saying that the prior trial was not void for all pur-
poses but merely reversed and remanded because of errors committed
therein.
The crime of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property requires
proof that someone other than the defendant stole the property. Thus,
352. 200 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
353. Id. at 844.
354. Id. at 845, following Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1965).
355. 390 U.S. 340 (1968).
356. 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Redrup is somewhat ambiguous, but it apparently stands for
the proposition that all written and pictorial material is protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments from the reach of federal and state obscenity laws if it is not pandered, sold to
juveniles, or communicated so as to intrude upon the privacy of those not wishing to be
exposed. If this interpretation is correct, even so-called hard-core pornography is constitu-
tionally protected.
357. 216 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1968).
358. 391 U.S. 596 (1968), citing Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
359. 208 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
360. 203 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; accord, State v. Sanders, 203 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1967).
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one who committed the theft or who was a principal to it could not be
convicted of buying, receiving, or concealing.86' Related to this principle
that the crime charged must be actually proven is the principle that there
must be no variance between the indictment or information and the
verdict. Thus, the conviction was reversed where the crime charged was
attempted grand larceny and the jury's verdict was "guilty as charged
with intent to commit grand larceny."3"2
The crime of desertion as defined by Florida Statutes section 856.04
requires that the defendant desert from the state of Florida.368
The crime of escape is committed where the defendant escapes from
custody prior to trial; conviction prior to the escape is not a necessary
element of the offense.364
Proof that the defendant was in possession of a "revolver" is
sufficient to support a conviction under Florida Statutes section 790.23,
which prohibits the possession of a "pistol" by felons.365
In State v. Davis,3 11 the defendant was charged with the possession
of a pistol by a felon and he set up as a defense the invalidity of his prior
conviction for lack of representation by counsel. Both the trial and ap-
pellate courts rejected this defense, but the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed, holding that a prior conviction may not be attacked except
where, as here, it is an element of the crime charged.867 The court further
stated that the proper procedure for asserting the defense is a pre-trial
motion to suppress the evidence of the prior conviction.
In George v. State, 68 the defendant was convicted of passing worth-
less checks in violation of Florida Statutes section 832.05(3). The
statute provides that the drawer is not guilty of a violation if the payee
knows or has reason to know that the check is worthless. Since the
defendant had made the check out to himself and then endorsed it to the
store, he was the payee and knew it was bad. Accordingly, he argued
rather disingenuously that he could not be deemed in violation of
Florida Statutes section 832.05(3). On appeal, however, his conviction
was affirmed. The court held that, in order to accomplish the intent of the
legislature, "payee" should be construed broadly to include any person
to whom the check is passed.
In State v. Pierce,69 the defendant was convicted of embezzlement.
The issue was whether the statute of limitations begins to run at the
time of the conversion of the funds or at the time that a demand was
361. Thomas v. State, 216 So.2d (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Ketelsen v. State, 211 So.2d 853
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
362. Goodman v. State, 203 So.2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
363. State v. Darnell, 217 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
364. Harris v. State, 217 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
36'5. Davis v. State, 215 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
366. 203 So.2d 160 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
367. Id.
368. 203 So.2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
369. 201 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1967).
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made for repayment. The court held that, as a rule of necessity, the
statute runs at the time of demand because it is difficult for the state to
prove the date of conversion. In effect, then, the statute begins to run
at the date of the discovery of the crime.
Parents are not guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
under Florida Statutes section 828.21 when their only act is allowing
their house to be used for a party at which minor third persons supply
liquor to other minors.
3 7 0
B. Defenses
Entrapment may not be asserted as a defense where the defendant
denies that he did the act charged.
3 1
In Van Eaton v. State,8 72 the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed
that Florida adheres to the M'Naghten rule of insanity and refused to
accept the irresistible impulse theory.
XXVII. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended, effective
midnight, September 30, 1968, by the Supreme Court of Florida acting
upon a petition of the Florida Bar. The amended rules appear at 211 So.2d
203 (1968). Only selected amendments will be discussed herein.
Rule 1.010 is amended to make the Rules of Criminal Procedure
applicable to "all criminal proceedings in State courts including proceed-
ings involving direct and indirect criminal contempt, except direct or
indirect criminal contempt of a court acting in any appellate capacity
and including proceedings under Rule 1.850 hereof."
Rule 1.120 is amended to permit, inter alia, a committing magistrate
to issue both summons and warrants for the arrest of persons against
whom a complaint is made.
Rule 1.140(C) (2) is amended to require, inter alia, that all "[a]ffi-
davits shall state the name of the affiant making the charge."
Rule 1.200 clarifies an ambiguity pertaining to the exchange of wit-
ness lists. The rule provides that " [n] ot more than five days after receipt
of defendant's witness list . .. the prosecuting attorney shall file and
serve upon the defendant the names and addresses ...of the witnesses
the State proposes to offer. . . ." The rule also imposes a continuing duty
on both the prosecution and the defense to disclose promptly the names
and addresses of additional witnesses which subsequently come to the
attention of either party.
Rule 1.790(6) was amended to permit the court to pronounce sen-
tence upon a defendant and to direct that the defendant be placed on
370. Zediker v. State, 218 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
371. Pearson v. State, 221 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
372. 205 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1967).
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probation upon completion of any specified period of the sentence of
imprisonment in the county jail.
XXVIII. LEGISLATION
The 1969 General Session of the Florida Legislature was extremely
active in adopting new legislation falling under the general rubric of
crime control. In addition, new offenses have been created, and old ones
redefined. Much of this legislation works significant changes in the
present system of criminal justice. Because of the volume and extensive-
ness of the new enactments, discussion in this survey will necessarily
be selective.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-1 amends Florida Statutes chapter
903 by adding the following provision, effective January 1, 1970, which
makes bail pending appeal a matter of the court's discretion: "Bail on
appeal after conviction shall be denied unless the defendant shall give
good and sufficient reasons to the court why such bail on appeal should
be granted."
Also taking effect on January 1, 1970, as Florida Laws 1969, chapter
69-2, which provides that if a person admitted to bail pending appeal
is convicted of a separate felony while free on bail, "the bail on appeal
shall be revoked and the defendant committed forthwith."
A third and perhaps the most important new enactment relating to
bail pending appeal is Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-307, which ab-
solutely prohibits a person once convicted of a felony from admission to
bail while appealing a second or subsequent felony conviction. This act
amends Florida Statutes section 903.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-10 repealed Florida Statutes chapter
521 and preempted the field, to the exclusion of counties and municipali-
ties, of prohibiting the exhibition of obscene films to minors under the
age of seventeen years. Specifically, the act makes it a misdemeanor,
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year
and/or a fine not exceeding $2,000 "knowingly to exhibit for a monetary
consideration to a minor . . . a motion picture, exhibition, show, repre-
sentation or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse and which
is harmful to minors." The provisions of the act are not applicable when
a minor is accompanied by one or both of his parents. The act also
provides for injunctive proceedings to prevent such shows or exhibitions
upon the relation of a prosecuting attorney.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-41 complements chapter 69-10 by
prohibiting the sale or other distribution of books, pamphlets, magazines,
or other printed or pictorial matter "which depicts nudity, sexual conduct
or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to juveniles ......
Florida Laws, chapter 69-17 enacted a comprehensive wiretapping
and electronic surveillance law which is nearly identical to a recent federal
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act. 7 3 The act is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it attempts to
protect the privacy of innocent persons by prohibiting the interception
and disclosure of wire or oral communications, except when one of the
parties consents to such interception. If an unauthorized interception does
occur, neither the contents of the communication nor any evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceeding of the state, or any
of its political subdivisions. Finally, the act prohibits the manufacture,
distribution, possession, and advertising of wire or oral communication
intercepting devices.
On the other hand, the legislative findings make it clear that the act
is designed as a weapon against organized crime. It therefore authorizes
any state attorney to apply to a judge for an order authorizing or ap-
proving the interception of wire or oral communications by any law
enforcement agency of the state, or any political subdivision thereof,
when it may furnish evidence of the commission of or conspiracy to
commit enumerated felonies. Any information derived from such
authorized interception may be introduced into evidence in any criminal
or grand jury proceeding if such testimony is otherwise admissible.
Section 9 of the chapter sets forth in great detail the procedure by
which such court authorization may be obtained. The application is re-
quired to be very narrow in scope, and an order approving the intercep-
tion is not to last longer than thirty days. Section 9 is too detailed for
full discussion in this survey, but implicit in its provisions, and, indeed,
throughout the entire act, is an attempt to comply with the fourth amend-
ment requirements relating to wiretapping and electronic surveillance as
set forth in the United States Supreme Court cases of Berger v. New
York374 and Katz v. United States.375
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-135 is another weapon in the arsenal
against organized crime. It prohibits "loan sharking or shylocking" by
making the extension of credit at a rate in excess of 25% but not in
excess of 45% per annum a misdemeanor; the extension of credit at a
rate in excess of 45% per annum a felony; and the extortionate exten-
sion of credit a felony punishable by a maximum of ten years in prison.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-91 amends Florida Statutes sub-
section 849.09(1) by the addition of a provision which makes unlawful
the possession of tally sheets and other papers, records, and paraphernalia
designed for use in connection with prohibited lotteries and gambling. A
violation of this act is a misdemeanor.
Of great importance is Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-73, which
373. Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (Supp. 1969).
374. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Berger struck down New York's electronic eavesdropping
statute as violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments because the statute did not
provide, inter alia, for sufficient judicial supervision of the surveillance activities.
375. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz held that wiretapping can pass constitutional muster
only if it is authorized by a narrowly circumscribed search warrant.
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enacts a "Florida Stop and Frisk Law." The act empowers any law
enforcement officer of the state to temporarily detain and question a
person "under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the
criminal laws of this state, or the criminal ordinances of any municipality,
or of any county ..... " In addition, the officer may make a search, reason-
ably limited in scope, to ascertain if the person detained is armed with a
dangerous weapon.
376
Another "law and order" measure is Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-
306, which makes the use of a firearm in the commission of or attempted
commission of a felony a felony itself. The provisions of the act also apply
to any person under indictment who displays, uses, or carries a concealed
weapon. In addition, there is a mandatory minimum ten-year sentence
for second offenders under both categories.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-65 provides an interesting amend-
ment to Florida Statutes section 811.021(2), (3) by redefining grand
larceny to include the fraudulent taking of property of an aggregate
value of 200 dollars or more in any consecutive twelve-month period. If
the aggregate value is less than 100 dollars, the offender shall be deemed
guilty of petit larceny.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-37 amends Florida Statutes section
404.15 to require mandatory imprisonment of persons convicted of
selling drugs to persons under age twenty-one and to prohibit the sus-
pending or deferring of sentence or the granting of probation to persons
so convicted.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-318 amends Florida Statutes chapter
398 (The Uniform Narcotic Drug Law) by adding a new section which
makes it unlawful for any person to possess, control, sell, or deliver any
devices or contrivances or paraphernalia with the intent to use them for
unlawfully injecting, smoking, or using any narcotic. An identical act,
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-270, amends Florida Statutes chapter 404
(Florida Drug Abuse Law) and applies to any drug controlled by chapter
404. Both acts become effective January 1, 1970.
Enforcement of the narcotics laws is facilitated by Florida Laws
1969, chapter 69-364, which declares any place in which narcotic drugs,
hallucinogens, etc. are kept or sold to be a public nuisance. Another
enforcement tool is Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-18, which amends
Florida Statutes section 933.18 to add the violation of drug abuse laws
to the list of conditions for which a warrant may be issued for the search
of a private dwelling.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-146 strips the juvenile court of
jurisdiction over a child of any age who is charged with a capital offense
376. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which authorizes a police officer to stop, on
"reasonable grounds" less than probable cause, and make a limited search, for weapons only,
incident thereto. See also the consolidated companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968).
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or an offense punishable by life imprisonment. In such cases, the child
is to be tried as an adult. Another measure directed at juvenile offenders
is Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-113, which provides for the fingerprint-
ing and photographing of every child taken into custody upon probable
cause that he has committed a felony. Such records are to be kept in a
confidential file and shall not be public records. If the child is found not
to have committed a felony, then his file may be destroyed. The obvious
purpose of these two statutes is to maintain the protection accorded
juveniles who commit minor offenses, i.e., acts of delinquency, while
enabling the police to build up data sources to aid in the apprehension
and punishment of juveniles who commit serious crimes.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-332 provides that an escape or
attempted escape from any penal institution of the state or subdivision
thereof, shall be a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than
ten years, such sentence to run consecutive to the prisoner's former
sentence.
Florida Laws 1969, chapter 69-25 amends Florida Statutes section
365.16 to include harrassing, threatening and abusive phone calls as
well as lewd and lascivious ones.
An important change in criminal procedure results from Florida
Laws 1969, chapter 69-15, which amends Florida Statutes section 924.07
by adding subsection (7), which permits the state to appeal an order
adjudicating a defendant insane under Florida Statutes chapter 917, and
subsection (8), which permits the state to appeal "[a]ll other pre-trial
orders . . . provided that the state shall pay all costs of such appeal,
except for the defendant's attorney's fee."
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